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Introduction
The New Deal legislation that was enacted during the Great
Depression imposed a pervasive regulatory structure over the
securities industry,' as well as defining the role of banks in the
Professor of Law, Florida International University at Miami.
I The securities industry was subject to intense regulation during the Great
Depression through a series of six statutes: the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et
seq. (2000) (requiring public offerings of securities to be accompanied by a prospectus
and to be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)); the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2000) (imposing regulation over broker-
dealers and trading markets and establishing voting and periodic reporting requirements
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economy, 2 and increasing the regulation of derivatives trading.3 At
the end of the twentieth century, however, Congress began to
dismantle significant pieces of this dated regulatory structure.
Most prominently, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA)4
repealed the provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act5 that had
separated investment banking from commercial banking. GLBA
now allows commercial banks, through "financial holding
companies," to engage in merchant banking6 and to participate in
the insurance business.7 Restrictions on interstate banking and
branching had been repealed even earlier.8
on publicly held companies); the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15
U.S.C. § 79a et seq. (simplifying the holding company structures for public utility
companies); the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa et seq. (2000) (imposing
requirements on trustees of public bond sales sold under indenture agreements); the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq. (2000) (requiring
registration of investment advisors and imposing record keeping and other
requirements); and the Investment Company Act of 1940 , 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq.
(2000) (regulating closed and open end investment companies). See THOMAS L. HAZEN,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION (4th ed. 2001) (providing a general
description of the federal securities laws).
2 See the Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
3 See the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, 15 U.S.C. § I et seq. (2000)
(regulating futures trading); JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING AND ITS REGULATION (1987) (describing the history of the Commodity
Exchange Act).
4 Pub. L. No. 106-102 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832).
5 The Glass-Steagall Act was a part of the Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-
66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). See generally
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1059 (1988) (describing Glass-Steagall provisions).
6 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (2000). Merchant banking is simply a reference to
instances where banks take equity investments in non-public companies. Prior to GLBA,
banks could make only limited investments in commercial firms. That restriction was
loosened by GLBA, but bank regulators still limit the amount and duration of merchant
banking investments in order to prevent the creation of industrial banks. 12 C.F.R. § pt.
225. See generally LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK
FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES, CASES AND MATERIALS 758-59 (2001) (description of
GLBA merchant banking provisions).
7 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(B) (2000).
8 The McFadden Act of 1927 and the Banking Act of 1933 had subjected national
banks to the branching restrictions of the individual states. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (2000). The
Douglas amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act also precluded interstate
banking by national banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (2000). The Riegle-Neal Interstate
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In another financial sector, the Commodity Exchange Act of
1936, which had confined futures trading to regulated "contract
markets," was revamped with the adoption of the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA).9 That legislation
authorized the creation of virtually unregulated off-exchange
markets for institutions in derivative instruments, leaving only a
regulated structure over retail markets where small customers
participate."° A much larger sector of finance-insurance-
remains unregulated by the federal government. 1
In contrast to these events, with the exception of strengthening
amendments passed in the aftermath of various scandals,12 the
federal securities laws remain pretty much in the form arrived at in
the 1930s. This seems strange in light of the dynamic changes in
the securities industry in the latter half of the last century. The
creation of the Internet, the integration of derivatives, the
development of electronic trading systems, and the growth of
global markets transformed the securities markets, leaving only a
few vestiges of the industry that existed when the federal securities
laws were enacted.
Of equal note is the fact that full disclosure under the federal
securities laws does not seem to be accomplishing its goals. That
concept hinges on the accuracy and integrity of accounting
statements. There is much evidence that those statements are
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338,
struck those restrictions on branching and interstate banking. States were allowed to opt
in or out of these provisions. Most states decided to allow interstate branching and
banking. For a description of interstate and branching restrictions and their removal, see
Hayley M. Brady & Mark V. Purpra, Note, The Riegle-Neal Amendments Act of 1997:
The Impact of Interstate Branching on the Dual Banking System, 2 N.C. BANKING INST.
230 (1998).
9 Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 7 U.S.C.).
10 CFMA (Title III, § 303) subjected swap transactions involving securities to the
anti-fraud provisions of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b), but not to the registration or other requirements of the federal securities laws.
Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., 295 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2002) (describing application of Section
10(b) to securities swaps).
I I See Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before and
After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 723 (2000) (describing efforts to
impose federal regulation).
12 See infra notes 211-264 and accompanying text.
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seriously flawed. The collapse of the Enron Corporation turned out
to be an accounting scandal of historic proportions. It was
followed by others, including WorldCom, Inc., which became the
largest bankruptcy ever. A flood of restated earnings were reported
by other companies that were fudging their earnings in an attempt
to escalate the market price of their stock.13 Analysts were accused
of being touts, rather than conductors of objective examinations of
company prospects.
The Enron-telecom-analysts scandals track, in many ways,
those scandals occurring before the stock market crash of 1929,
which the SEC was created to prevent. This was not its only
failure. The federal securities laws failed to stop the market bubble
of the 1990s that burst in 2000 and continued to plunge in the
following years. 4 The market run up was, if anything, greater than
that of the 1920s, and the fall nearly as precipitous. Estimates have
ranged as high as $8.5 trillion as to the market value lost during
the market reverse that began in 2000.15 How did full disclosure
aid investors in this debacle?
This article will describe the background of the federal
securities laws and the assumptions about full disclosure that were
made to justify this intrusive legislation. Problems encountered by
the SEC in the nearly seven decades that have passed since the
Stock Market Crash of 1929 are also considered. Then, the article
reviews the market meltdown over the last three years and
describes how full disclosure regulation failed. It then focuses on a
principal flaw in the system-the misguided effort to turn
accountants into policeman.
13 See infra notes 318-411 and accompanying text.
14 Anitha Reddy, A Dismal 2002 Ends Quietly on Wall Street, WASH. POST, Jan. 1,
2003, at El.
15 Cutting Interest Rates Won't Halt Deflation, POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 5, 2002, at
B6. The S&P 500 Index was more resilient, but it fell by fifteen percent during 2001.
This was the second year that index fell more than ten percent. Alex Berenson,
Prognosis for Stocks Brightens After 2 Years of Big Declines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2002,
at Cl.
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The Federal Securities Laws
Before the SEC
The myth has arisen that America owes its dominant place in
finance to the transparency required by the federal securities
laws. 6 That transparency, and tough enforcement by the SEC, is
said to have reestablished investor confidence in the market after
the stock market crash of 1929 and encouraged investment. In fact,
the United States had achieved financial dominance well before
the adoption of the federal securities laws and the creation of the
SEC in the 1930s. 1" The capital raising efforts and speculations of
the Robber Barons of the nineteenth century 8 and the growth of
the more professional investment bankers such as J.P. Morgan &
Co. and E.H. Harriman 9 laid the foundation for American
financial leadership.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the investment
bankers were consolidating whole industries, making them more
efficient and competitive on the world stage.2' They created a
national economy and provided vast amounts of new finance for
what were then fledgling hi-tech industries such as automobiles,
electricity, telephones, radios, and motion pictures.21 At the time of
the outbreak of World War I, these financiers controlled vast
16 See generally Thomas Russo, Rationalizing Risk, FIN. TIMES (LEXIS), July 21,
1998, at 12 (discussing transparency concept); Dan Gerstenfeld, Don't Bank on It,
JERUSALEM POST (LEXIS), Dec. 21, 2000, at 15 (discussing transparency concept).
17 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, in vOlS. I-
Ill (2001) (describing the growth of America's role in finance).
18 The robber barons included Cornelius Vanderbilt, Daniel Drew, Jay Gould, and
James Fisk. See generally MAURY KLEIN, THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF JAY GOULD (1986);
WHEATON J. LANE, COMMODORE VANDERBILT: AN EPIC OF THE STEAM AGE (1942)
(describing the robber barons).
19 See generally RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING
DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE (1990); MAURY KLEIN, THE LIFE AND
LEGEND OF E.H. HARRIMAN (2000) (description of these financiers).
20 These activities included a reorganization of the railroad industry and the
combination of steel companies into U.S. Steel, the first billion-dollar corporation. See
generally DOLORES GREENBERG, FINANCIERS AND RAILROADS, 1869-1889 (1980)
(describing reorganization of railroads); JOHN MOODY, THE MASTERS OF CAPITAL: A
CHRONICLE OF WALL STREET 80-83 (1919) (description of U.S. Steel combination).
21 See MAURY KLEIN, RAINBOW'S END: THE CRASH OF 1929 108, 115 (2001)
(describing the growth of manufacturing before the Stock Market Crash of 1929).
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amalgamations of capital and could raise enormous sums for
investment through sophisticated underwriting methods.22 That
skill proved handy when the European nations turned to America
to fund their armies. America responded by providing a
significant portion of the capital used to wage that conflict, while
at the same time allowing America to field its own forces. The
United States was the financial, as well as the political, center of
the world at the conclusion of that war.23
Regulation of securities trading and sales was largely a matter
of state law before the advent of the SEC. That regulation was
limited.24 Gambling statutes were used to proscribe betting on
stock price changes.25 An established body of case law governed
the duties of brokers to customers.26 Stockbrokers, for example,
were held to owe fiduciary duties to their customers for whom
they were acting as agents. 27 The states exercised some direct
regulatory control through laws governing corporations and their
charters. New Jersey had broken new ground in this area by
allowing corporations to have broad corporate powers and by
allowing holding company structures. This allowed the trusts, such
as Standard Oil, which were then under attack, to operate legally.28
22 J.P. Morgan & Co. was among the leading investment bankers that led these
capital-raising efforts. Id.
23 See HERBERT D. SEIBERT & Co., THE BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL RECORD OF THE
WORLD WAR YEARS (1975) (describing the finance provided by American markets to the
World War I belligerents (including Germany until America entered the war)). The
United States was a net creditor as early as 1895. Charles R. Morris, From Merchants to
Bankers, WALL ST. J., April 2, 2003, at D8. The United States was also a net creditor
during World War 1. ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE (1913-
1951) 83, n. 37 (2003).
24 New York prohibited short sales in 1812, but that legislation was repealed
several years later. J. EDWARD MEEKER, SHORT SELLING 231-32 (1932).
25 Justh v. Holliday, 2 Mackey 346 (1883) ("difference" trading on stocks held to
be gambling).
26 See generally JOHN R. DoS PASSOS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF STOCKBROKERS
AND STOCK EXCHANGES (1882) (description of case law on stockbroker obligations
before the adoption of the federal securities laws); CHARLES H. MEYER, THE LAW OF
STOCKBROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES AND OF COMMODITY BROKERS AND COMMODITY
EXCHANGES (1931) (description of case law on stockbroker obligations before the
adoption of the federal securities laws).
27 Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N.Y. 235, 244-45 (1869).
28 See PETER KRASS, CARNEGIE 257 (2002) (describing the operation of the
Standard Oil Trust).
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29Other states mimicked this practice.
Some states established regulatory commissions to supervise
their corporations or assigned the Secretary of State that duty.30 In
1903, Connecticut required mining and oil companies to file a
certificate with the Secretary of State that described their finances
and their drilling or mining activities.3 Seven years later, Rhode
Island required out-of-state issuers of securities to file financial
reports with the Secretary of State.32 Kansas enacted the first "blue
sky" law in 1911. 33 It required companies selling securities in
Kansas to register with the bank commissioner and disclose
information about their operations. Stockbrokers were required to
be registered.34 The Kansas legislation became a model for other
states. Over twenty states adopted some form of blue sky law
shortly after the enactment of the Kansas legislation.35
In New York, brokers were prohibited from hypothecating
customer securities without their consent, except to the extent the
securities were being posted on margin.36 The state also prohibited
false or misleading rumors, statements, or advertisements in
29 Just before leaving the Governor's office to become President, however, Woodrow
Wilson signed legislation that barred the incorporation of holding companies in New Jersey.
KENDRICK A. CLEMENTS, WOODROW WILSON, WORLD STATESMAN 71 (1987). The large
corporations then moved their charters to Delaware, which dedicated itself to providing
favorable conditions for large businesses. ROBERT F. HIMMELBERG, BUSINESS AND
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 1870 688-89 (1994); FREDERICK LEWIS ALLEN, THE LORDS
OF CREATION 255 (1935); see Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (providing a critical description of the growth of enabling corporate laws).
30 H.R. Rep. No. 62-1593, at 151 (1913).
31 Louis Loss & EDWARD M. COWETr, BLUE SKY LAW 5 (1958).
32 Id. at 6.
33 DAVID SAUL ROBERTS, REGULATING THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY: THE EVOLUTION OF
A GOVERNMENT POLICY 24-25 (1969).
34 LOSS & COWETT, supra note 31, at 4; VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING
IN AMERICA, A HISTORY 162 (1970); ROBERTS, supra note 33, at 25.
35 Between 1910 and 1933, blue sky laws were adopted in all of the states except
Nevada. Loss & COWETT, supra note 31, at 17; WILLIAM J. SHULTZ & M. R. CANE,
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 602 (1937). The Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of these state statutes. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539
(1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stockyard Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N. W.
Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917).
36 MEYER, supra note 26, at 331; RAYMOND VERNON, THE REGULATION OF STOCK
EXCHANGE MEMBERS 30 (1941).
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connection with the sale of securities.37 New York additionally
prohibited bucket shops, manipulation, and fictitious
transactions. 38 The Martin Act-adopted in 1921-sought to curb
securities fraud scandals that were occurring after World War L39
That act authorized the New York attorney general to investigate
and seek injunctions against fraudulent securities practices or
manipulative activities.40 The Martin Act was a broad based anti-
fraud measure, rather than a disclosure device.4' It would become
a popular means for the New York Attorney General, Elliot
Spitzer, to establish near predominance over securities regulation
in this century.42
One area that was not generally regulated was trading by
corporate insiders of their own company's stock using inside
information. Most state courts held that insiders could trade freely
in their company's securities.4a Margin trading was supported by
the "call money" market in New York that allowed banks to make
short-term loans using securities as collateral. The call money
market was unregulated even though it "played a role in all major
financial crises from 1873 to 1907.""
37 WILLIAM HARMON BLACK, THE LAW OF STOCK EXCHANGES, STOCK BROKERS &
CUSTOMERS 146-48 (1940).
38 MARGARET G. MYERS, THE NEW YORK MONEY MARKET, ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENTS 313-14 (1931).
39 The Martin Act was passed in 1921 but was not funded for enforcement by the
New York Attorney General until 1923. In the Matter of Ottinger, 148 N.E. 627 (Ct.
App. N.Y. 1925).
40 Louis Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 21-23 (1951).
41 Bishop v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1557, 1565 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
42 See infra notes 314-411 and accompanying text.
43 See e.g., Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581, 584 (N.Y. 1868); see also
Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661-62 (Mass. 1933). A few states required
disclosures of non-public information by insiders when dealing face-to-face, as
exemplified by the Supreme Court's creation of something called the "special facts"
doctrine, which required insiders to disclose facts of a particularly important nature.
Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
44 A Study by the Staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, A
Review and Evaluation of Federal Margin Regulations 44 (Dec. 1984).
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Federal Regulatory Efforts
The earliest efforts to regulate the issuance and trading of
corporate securities on the federal level seems to have begun with
charter limitations imposed by Alexander Hamilton on the Bank of
the United States. Among other things, the bank's charter imposed
voting restrictions on large shareholders, and the Treasury
Department was authorized to inspect its records and audit its
accounts and financial condition.45 The National Banking Act of
1863 also created a class of federally chartered banks that were
subjected to direct federal supervision by the Treasury
Department, but this was not disclosure legislation.46 The
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was another effort to regulate
corporations; directed mostly at railroad activities, it too did not
choose disclosure as a regulatory model.47 Broader in reach was
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act that was passed in 1890,48 but it was
only a blunt tool that had little direct application to securities
trading.49
There was no full disclosure available for shareholders before
the adoption of the federal securities laws in the 1930s.
45 A. BARTON HEPBURN, HISTORY OF COINAGE AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE PERENNIAL CONTEST FOR SOUND MONEY 457-59 (1903). The creation of
the Bank of the United States touched off a debate in George Washington's cabinet over
whether the federal government had the power to charter corporations. Washington
decided that Congress did have such an implied power, and the Supreme Court
subsequently confirmed that authority in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
Congress has never used its chartering power broadly, and proposals to create a universal
federal charter as a means of increasing regulation over corporations who often chartered
in the state having the most lax laws (i.e., Delaware) have never gained much support.
See JAMES D. COX, ET AL., CORPORATIONS, § 2.11 (1995) (describing federal chartering
proposals).
46 Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C.
BANKING INST. 221, 228 (2000). An effort to regulate futures trading in gold during the
Civil War lasted a mere two weeks before its repeal. MARKHAM, supra note 3, at 7
(1987).
47 KLEIN, supra note 19, at 76.
48 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
49 After World War II, the government would use the antitrust laws as the basis for
a massive but unsuccessful attack on investment bankers. United States v. Morgan, 118
F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). More successful were suits brought against Nasdaq
market-makers for colluding on quotes during the 1990s. JERRY W. MARKHAM &
THOMAS L. HAZEN, BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES
LAW § 2.09[7] (2000).
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Prospectuses used to sell stocks were "little more than notices."5 °
There was no authority for the government to compel disclosures
on the finances of publicly traded stocks. The American Sugar
Refining Company even refused to report to the Census Bureau.5
Although the New York Stock Exchange required some financial
reporting by "listed" companies, "unlisted" companies traded on
that exchange-such as the American Sugar Refining Company-
were not required to provide any financial information.
5 2
A Bureau of Corporations was created in the Department of
Commerce and Labor after the turn of the century as a means of
gathering information on large corporations, but it had little
success and was merged into the Federal Trade Commission in
1914."3 Before its demise, the Bureau of Corporations sought to
have congress adopt a federal charter requirement that would give
it control over large corporations but that too was a non-starter.54
The first serious inquiry on the federal level for regulating
securities activities seems to have been that of the Industrial
Commission in 1898. It sought federal legislation to stop short
sellilhg, which was thought to be the cause of market breaks that
resulted in large losses to shareholders. 55  The Industrial
Commission further recommended that corporations be required to
provide shareholders with annual financial reports. Those
recommendations were not adopted.
More important to the effort to impose federal regulation was
the congressional investigation that followed the Panic of 1907,
which sought to determine if there was a money trust that was
controlling American business. That inquiry was the result of the
muckraking journalists and "progressive" legislators such as
Charles Lindbergh, a congressman from Minnesota and the father
50 Morgan, 118 F. Supp. at 639.
51 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM
CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492-1900) 333 (2002) [hereinafter I
MARKHAM].
52 Id. at 4.
53 RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES 46 (1996); LoSS, supra note 40, at 59-60.
54 ROBERTS, supra note 33, at 35.
55 Congress Investigates "Short" Selling Practices, xi Congressional Digest, No. 12, at
291 (Dec. 1932). This proposal is now being revived as a way to control market prices. See
infra notes 465-466.
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of the famous flier.56 Lindbergh's claims led to a congressional
investigation conducted by the House Committee on Banking,
chaired by Arsene Pujo of Louisiana.57 The Committee did indeed
find that J.P. Morgan & Co., the First National Bank, the National
City Bank, and a few others controlled vast railroad and other
enterprises through interlocking directorships.58  The Pujo
Committee also discovered numerous abuses in the securities
markets, including insider trading.59
Despite these revelations, Congress did not choose to regulate
the securities markets. Instead, it passed the Clayton Antitrust
Act6" and created the Federal Trade Commission61 in order to stop
non-competitive practices and abuses of interlocking directorships.
The financial regulatory structure was enhanced in 1913 with the
creation of the Federal Reserve System. That institution was
formed in the aftermath of the Panic of 1907 at the behest of a
group of bankers and was intended to assure that there was
adequate liquidity in the money markets during times of stress.62
The next serious effort to regulate securities trading arose
during World War I. The Liberty Loan Committee in New York,
which was administered with the Federal Reserve Board (Fed),
established a subcommittee on money rates (the Money
Committee) that sought to regulate the call money market to
assure adequate liquidity so as to avert market panics.63 The
Treasury Department and the Fed also formed a Capital Issues
Committee (CIC) that at first operated on a voluntary basis but
was later given congressional authority to require submission of
56 A. SCOTT BERG, LINDBERGH 75 (1998).
57 H. Rep. No. 62-1593 (1913).
58 Id. at 131.
59 Id. at 43. An earlier investigation by the New York Governor Charles E.
Hughes's Committee on Speculation in Securities and Commodities that was conducted
after the Panic of 1907 had also found numerous abuses in securities trading. W. C. VAN
ANTWERP, THE STOCK EXCHANGE FROM WIThIN 419 (1913).
60 MYERS, supra note 38, at 299.
61 ALLEN, supra note 29, at 191.
62 Markham, supra note 46, at 228-31.
63 LESTER V. CHANDLER, BENJAMIN STRONG, CENTRAL BANKER 124-27 (1958); The
Financial Situation: No Funds for Big Speculative Market, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1918, at 10;
BENJAMIN HAGGoTr BECKHART, THE NEW YORK MONEY MARKET 65 (1932); SHuLTz &
CAINE, supra note 35, at 568-69.
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security issues for review and approval. The CIC reviewed
securities offerings in excess of $100,000 to ensure that they were
compatible with the war effort.64 This was basically a way to bar
speculative enterprises from tapping the capital markets. Unless
approved as meeting that standard, securities offerings could not
go forward. Before concluding its operations, the CIC submitted a
report to Congress recommending the continuance of its
operations after the war. The committee reported that market
operators were fleecing unsophisticated individuals through
schemes in which valuable Liberty bonds were exchanged for
worthless securities. The CIC concluded that state blue sky laws
were inadequate to deal with such problems. Congress failed to
respond to the CIC's concerns.65
The CIC had administered a substantive review process for
approving the use of funds being raised by underwritings, but the
legislation it sought was disclosure based. President Woodrow
Wilson asked Congress for such legislation in order to "stop
speculation and to prevent the fraudulent methods of promotion by
which our people are annually fleeced on many millions of hard
earned money."66 This legislation was not adopted, but the Fed, at
the urging of the Secretary of Commerce, did publish a pamphlet
in 1917 entitled "Approved Methods for the Preparation of
Balance Sheets. 67
The Stock Market Crash and the New Deal
The causes of the Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the ensuing
Great Depression are still debated.68 Variously blamed are
64 HERBERT D. SEIBERT & Co., THE BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL RECORD OF WORLD
WAR YEARS 267 (1975); WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CAPITAL ISSUES COMMITTEE
AND WAR FINANCE CORPORATION 17 (1934); CAROSSO, supra note 34, at 231.
65 REPORT OF THE CAPITAL ISSUES COMMITEE, H.R. Doc. No. 65-1836, at 2-3 (1919).
66 Securities Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency on
S. 875, 73d Cong. 315 (1934).
67 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM J.P.
MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (1900-1970) 91 (2001) [hereinafter II
MARKHAM]. President Calvin Coolidge rejected a request made by Professor William Z.
Ripley to have the Federal Trade Commission require corporations to file financial
reports. The President thought this was a matter better left to the states. Id. at 128.
68 KLEIN, supra note 19, at xiii. "Nobody has ever established a clear and
conclusive link between the events of October 1929 and the 1930s depression." Wall
Street Crash, Parallel Bars, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 27, 2001, at 81.
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excessive speculation through margin accounts and abusive
market practices such as the organized pools that were operating in
over one hundred New York Stock Exchange stocks.69 Margin
trading was claimed to have induced excessive speculation and
soaked up credit needed for industrial use.7" More recent focus has
centered on the blunders of the Fed, which first eased credit in
order to support England's effort to return to the gold standard,
thereby boosting the market. The Fed then reversed course and
sought to curb the market through ill-conceived interest rate
increases.71 These blunders would be repeated in the market
meltdown that began in 2000.72
New York Governor Franklin Roosevelt sought and won the
presidency on a platform of attacking the financiers and
advocating legislation that would effectively cripple them.73 This
was not an original plan. Franklin Roosevelt had modeled his
career after that of his cousin, Theodore, both having served as
Assistant Secretary of the Navy and Governor of New York.
7 4
Theodore Roosevelt had also used attacks on the financiers to
bolster his populous image. One such set of attacks was said to
have demoralized the market and caused the stock market panic of
1907. He attacked the "tyranny of mere wealth, ' 75 and his charges
69 S. Rep. No. 1455, at 32-33 (1933).
70 S. Rep. No. 792, at 3 (1934); Stock Exchange Regulation, Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720, 73d
Cong. 2d Sess. 68 (1934).
71 KLEIN, supra note 19, at 132-34, 188. See generally II MARKHAM, supra note
67, at 151 (describing changes by the Fed in interest rate policy and market plunge).
72 See infra notes 190-210 and accompanying text.
73 Among other things, Roosevelt asserted that "the day of the great promoter or
the financial Titan, to whom we granted everything as only he would build, or develop,
is over." DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN
DEPRESSION AND WAR 373 (1999). Ironically, Governor Franklin Roosevelt was the only
person in America with the power to have regulated the stock markets before their crash.
The New York Martin Act, which is now being used to regulate the markets nationally
by the New York attorney general, was already on the books for Franklin Roosevelt to
invoke, or at least demand that state and local prosecutors employ.
74 See FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT, A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY 16-
17, 23, 54-55 (1990) (describing Franklin's admiration for Theodore and parallel
offices); EDMUND MORRIS, THE RISE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 691-709 (1979)
(describing Theodore Roosevelt as governor of New York).
75 NATHAN MILLER, THEODORE ROOSEVELT, A LIFE 365 (1992).
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against the "malefactors of great wealth" was said to have
undermined confidence in the business community before the
Panic of 1907.76 Theodore Roosevelt's trust busting lawsuits added
to the demagoguery directed against business that frequently
marked his administration.77 Theodore too had called for the
creation of a federal commission to regulate securities, 78 a demand
that Franklin would mimic and would succeed in implementing
through the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Franklin also copied
Theodore's populist attacks on the financiers. Franklin attacked the
financiers with statements such as: the "practices of the
unscrupulous money changers stand indicted in the court of public
opinion, rejected by the hearts and minds of men," and that "the
money changers have fled from their high seats in the temple of
our civilization. We may now restore that temple to the ancient
truths. ' ' 79
The congressional investigations that followed the stock
market crash of 1929 did little more than replicate the hearings
that followed the stock market panic of 1907. Both sought a
"money trust" on which to blame the country's economic woes.80
Both focused on margin, insider abuses, manipulation, and
excessive speculation.81 The difference was that a demoralized
congress in the 1930s was only too happy to find and punish
scapegoats. Wall Street made a nice bogeyman. After all, who
could feel sorry for a financier, a class that is, impossibly, even
less popular than lawyers, particularly in times of market declines.
The result was the enactment of the federal securities laws. Those
76 CHERNOW, supra note 19, at 538.
77 MILLER, supra note 75, at 366-67.
78 Id. at 365.
79 JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 19 (1995).
The legislative history of the federal securities laws is full of charges that speculative
"orgies" and excessive speculation were occurring in the markets. See e.g., S. Rep. No.
1455, at 9 (1934) (reference to speculative orgies); S. Rep. No. 792, at 3 (1934)
(reference to uncontrolled speculation).
80 For a description of the hearings that followed the stock market panic of 1907,
see supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
81 For the issues addressed in the hearings following the stock market crash of
1929, see S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1933).
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statutes sought to provide the investor with "complete and truthful
information from which he may intelligently appraise the value of
a security, and to safeguard against the negligent and fraudulent
practices perpetrated upon him in the past by incompetent and
unscrupulous bankers, underwriters, dealers, and issuers. 82
The federal securities laws, despite all the ballyhoo, did not
end the Great Depression. Controversy exists over what caused
and prolonged the Great Depression. Some claimed that the
market crash caused the depression, post hoc ergo propter hoc.83
Indeed, recessions and depressions often followed a market crash.
The depression that began in 1893 was particularly prolonged and
deep.84 But that claim does no more than suggest that the market
anticipates the economic decline. The current view seems to be
that the stock market crash of 1929 "was probably an event of
relatively minor significance" in causing the Great Depression."
Others suggest that the tariff wars raging around the world as the
depression worsened prolonged and deepened its effects by almost
stopping international trade.86 More blundering by the Federal
Reserve pushed the country back into depression when a recovery
appeared imminent in 1937. 87 As the Economist noted, the
depression "was caused by wrong-headed monetary and fiscal
policy, combined with the Smoot Hawley tariffs, and not by
happenings on Wall Street." '88
82 S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 153 (1934).
83 For example, in a message to Congress, President Franklin Roosevelt asserted
that "unregulated speculation in securities and commodities was one of the most
important contributing factors in the artificial and unwarranted 'boom' which had so
much to do with the terrible conditions of the years following 1929." H.R. Rep. No. 421,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935).
84 CHARLES HOFFMAN, THE DEPRESSION OF THE NINETIES: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY 4
(1970).
85 CHARLES R. MORRIS, MONEY, GREED, AND RISK: WHY FINANCIAL CRISES AND
CRASHES HAPPEN 73 (1999).
86 KENNEDY, supra note 73, at 49, n. 12. World Trade declined by some two-thirds
between 1929 and 1933. ANTHONY S. CAMPAGNA, U.S. NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
1917-1985 79 (1987).
87 See WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE 321 (1987) (discussing Fed
actions in 1937). Additional attacks on Wall Street by Franklin Roosevelt during the
1936 elections further undermined confidence in the market. See KENNEDY, supra note
86, at 280 (describing Roosevelt's attacks).
88 Wall Street Crash, Parallel Bars, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 27, 2001, at 81.
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The enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act assured that the
investment bankers would be too weak to lead a recovery.89 They
were cut off from the financial strength provided previously by
commercial banks.9" The enactment of the federal securities laws
also added further burdens. The investment bankers turned to
private placements with large institutions, which were not covered
by the registration requirements. 9 In many instances, this involved
insurance companies that wanted only fixed income instruments.
That dependency on debt resulted in a distortion of corporate
balance sheets, as they increased debt and reduced equity
positions.9" This market was unavailable to small and medium size
entrepreneurs. 93 Rational entrepreneurs avoided the retail markets
in raising capital, leaving small investors with only those offerings
that could not be placed elsewhere.
Applying Federal Regulation
New Deal programs and spending relieved much of the
hardship but did nothing to restart the American economy.
Government spending was a poor substitute for the stock markets
and the capital raising efforts of private firms. The Great
Depression ended only after war broke out in Europe. 94
The war restarted the economy, not the SEC. Indeed, the SEC,
not surprisingly, was declared a non-essential agency during
World War II. It was shipped off to Philadelphia,95 an ignominy
89 U.S. v. Morgan, 118. F. Supp. 621, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
90 New private investments in the middle of the depression were about one-third of
the level for 1929. KENNEDY, supra note 73, at 351. As one author noted: "Capital, in
short, was hibernating." Id.
91 A "striking" change in finance was the increase in private placements that
followed the creation of the SEC. IRWIN FRIEND ET AL., INVESTMENT BANKING AND THE
NEW ISSUES MARKET 28-29 (1967).
92 TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 76TH CONG., 3D SESS.,
INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER, Monograph No. 28, 377-378
(1940).
93 Id. at 378.
94 The gross national product of the United States doubled between 1939 and 1945.
JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS, THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1974 56
(1996).
95 II MARKHAM, supra note 67, at 265.
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that still rankled SEC staff members thirty years later.96 The stock
markets continued to languish until after the end of World War II,
when the consumer economy began to boom. However, it was not
until November 17, 1954 that the market returned to its 1929 high,
under a more business friendly Eisenhower administration.97 The
Dow Jones Industrial Average tripled during the 1950s"8 as the
SEC lay moribund.99
During the 1950s, institutional investors began firmly
entrenching themselves in the market. 00 Their strength grew. By
1990, the institutional investor dominated the capital markets.0 1
Individual investors were net sellers of stock at the rate of about
3.5 million shares per day. 1 2 This result is not surprising, as many
small investors found themselves being fleeced by penny stock
promotions after the war. 103  These promotions included
speculative forays into technology stocks, which presaged the
Internet boom of the 1990s, 10 4 and various schemes concocted by
96 Id.
97 ROBERT SOBEL, N.Y.S.E., A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE,
1935-1975 225 (1975).
98 MONICA LANGLEY, TEARING DOWN THE WALLS, How SANDY WEILL FOUGHT HIS
WAY TO THE TOP OF THE FINANCIAL WORLD ... AND THEN NEARLY LOST IT ALL 18
(2003).
99 "[L]iterally and figuratively, the S.E.C. slept for most of the decade." JOHN
BROOKS, THE Go-Go YEARS 84 (1984).
100 "Due largely to the impact of the income and inheritance tax laws, the
importance of the individual as an investor diminished and there was an extraordinary
and continued growth in the size and the investment needs of large institutional
investors." U.S. v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
101 By 1961, institutions owned eighty percent of corporate bonds. StDNEY ROBBINS,
THE SECURITIES MARKETS, OPERATIONS AND ISSUES 216-17 (1966). Individual investors
owned ninety percent of all stocks at the beginning of the 1950s. In 1990, institutions
would own more than half of all stocks. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE AND WHARTON
SCHOOL, THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF STOCK OWNERSHIP PATTERNS 1 (1993). At this
time, the institutions held thirty-nine percent of all over-the-counter stocks and eighty-
seven percent of privately placed securities. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS: U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS AND INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY 6, n.8 (1990) [hereinafter BULLS AND BEARS]. By 1980, institutions were
accounting for over seventy percent of New York Stock Exchange volume. Joel
Seligman, TheFuture of the National Market System, 10 J. CORP. L. 79, 114 (1984).
102 BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 101, at 28.
103 SOBEL, supra note 97, at 221.
104 See infra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
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an underworld of felons to loot publicly traded companies. 5
Boiler rooms were also selling penny stocks in Canadian and other
securities. 10 6 The SEC's presence and requirements for full
disclosure did not seem to hamper these schemes greatly."0 7
Market problems and scandals required constant amendments
to the federal securities laws. For example, amendments were
made in 1964 to strengthen financial reporting by public
companies. 1°8 The Williams Act regulated tender offers in 1968,
but failed to halt the merger mania of the 1980s and 1990s.'1 9 The
SEC also became a more aggressive agency in the 1960s. Its
activist chairman, William Carey, created a new insider trading
concept" l0 that was made up whole cloth under Rule lOb-5."' This
position claimed a doctrine of "equal access" to information under
Rule lOb-5." 2 The Supreme Court later rejected that claim,"3 but
105 These characters included Lowell Birrell, Ben Cage, Earl Belle, Alexander
Guterma, Serge Rubinstein, and Virgil Dardi who collectively destroyed seventy-five
large corporations and defrauded investors of $100 million, at a time when $100 million
was a lot of money. FRANK CORMIER, WALL STREET'S SHADY SIDE 146 (1962); T. A.
WISE, THE INSIDERS: A STOCKHOLDER'S GUIDE TO WALL STREET 120 (1962).
106 II MARKHAM, supra note 67, at 296. Sales of low priced stocks to
unsophisticated investors were often conducted through such high-pressure boiler room
operations. SELIGMAN, supra note 79, at 56-58.
107 A study by the Attorney General in New York in 1969 found that the disclosure
approach to the regulation of new securities issues was proving to be totally ineffective.
Insiders were often selling their shares into the market after their company's public issue
price had peaked. A REPORT TO THE HONORABLE LOUIS J. LEFKOWITZ, ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, PURSUANT TO SECTION 352 OF THE GENERAL
BUSINESS LAW ON NEW ISSUES OF SECURITIES (Oct. 1969).
108 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1994). See generally Richard Phillips & Morgan Shipman,
An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 1964 DUKE L.J. 706 (describing
amendments). Former SEC Chairman William 0. Douglas apparently did not believe
that insider trading was a crime. In 1953, while serving as a justice on the Supreme
Court, Douglas was tipped by his brother on an impending change in control of the
Statler Hotel chain, allowing Douglas to make a quick profit of $8,000 that was then
equal to about a third of his annual salary on the Court. BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD
BILL, THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 297 (2003).
109 Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (1994)). For a description of the Williams Act, see Miriam P.
Hechler, Toward a More Balanced Treatment of Bidder and Target Shareholders, 1997
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 319 (1997).
110 Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
111 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 Ob-5 (2002).
112 That position was accepted by the Second Circuit in the now famous case of
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the SEC continued its aggressive efforts to require equal access to
information, culminating in the somewhat ridiculous and infamous
Regulation FD.'
1 4
Despite the new aggression on the part of the SEC, scandals
continued. The 1960s became known as the "go-go" years in the
stock markets.115 The decade began with a massive scandal
involving specialists on the American Stock Exchange.' 1 6 Mutual
fund scandals also arrived with the use of "lettered stock."
'1 17
One such scandal of the 1960s was the implosion of Investors
Overseas Services (IOS), a giant off-shore mutual fund that had
been structured by Edward Cowett, co-author of a leading treatise
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub. nom.,
Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
113 Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
114 Regulation FD stands for "Fair Disclosure" and seeks to prevent selective
disclosures to analysts by corporate executives. Selective Disclosures and Insider
Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 3442259 (Dec. 20, 1999). The SEC had tried earlier
to impose such a requirement under Rule lob-5 but was slapped down by the Supreme
Court. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). Regulation FD seems to be completely at
odds with a full disclosure system. Analysts are private sector monitors who have the
ability to test company disclosures and make judgments that other investors do not have
the time or inclination to make. Denying these individuals access to corporate officials
will assure less information to investors, not more. Now, analysts may no longer look
behind the numbers presented by management. Their questions and objections may be
simply brushed aside by management with a citation to Regulation FD. As one former
analyst notes, those companies refusing to deal with analysts in the past simply refused
to put out information unless it was good or was done at a time of the company's own
choosing. MURIEL SIEBERT, CHANGING THE RULES, ADVENTURES OF A WALL STREET
MAVERICK 59 (2002); see also Richard Gibson, Cozy Analysts? Del Monte's Flap is the
Opposite, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2003, at C5 (company refuses to answer critical
analyst's question on a Regulation FD conference call). The current nominee for the SEC
chairman position had previously called the rule "crazy" but was toning down that
comment in his confirmation hearings. Deborah Solomon, SEC Nominee Urges Curbing
States Power, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2003, at A2. Denied their informational advantage,
analysts were left to hype stocks like snake oil in the market run up at the end of the last
century, giving rise to more scandal and a $1.4 billion settlement with regulators. See
infra notes 210-15 and accompanying text. For a defense of this rule by its principal
proponent, see ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET, WHAT WALL STREET AND
CORPORATE AMERICA DON'T WANT YOU TO KNOW, WHAT YOU CAN Do TO FIGHT BACK
(2002).
115 LANGLEY, supra note 98, at 18.
116 II MARKHAM, supra note 67, at 329.
117 Id. at 351-52.
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on Blue Sky laws.' i IOS was created to avoid regulation in the
United States.' 19 It was managed by a very colorful character,
Bernie Comfeld, whose loose administration led to sales to U.S.
investors, as well as fraud and dubious investments. 120 That
activity gave rise to regulatory action by the SEC, and lOS was
crippled. IOS was sold to Robert Vesco, who then proceeded to
loot the company of hundreds of millions of dollars. Vesco fled to
the Caribbean. He was subsequently jailed in Cuba but remains a
fugitive from United States justice. 12 1
Other scandals of the 1960s included the stock sales of Four
Seasons Nursing Centers, 22 the National Student Marketing
Corporation, 123  and the pyramid sales scheme of Glenn W.
Turner. 24 All of these investments proved to be disasters for
public investors. Full disclosure was doing nothing to stem these
frauds.
The SEC stood by helplessly at the end of the "go-go" years in
the 1960s 125 when the securities industry nearly imploded from
stock volumes that industry participants were not equipped to
handle. 12 6 The paperwork crisis created by the rising stock
volumes led to account insurance (SIPC) for customers owning
118 Loss & COWETT, supra note 31.
119 CHARLES RAW, ET AL., Do You SINCERELY WANT TO BE RICH?: THE FULL STORY
OF BERNARD CORNFELD AND IOS (1971).
120 Id.
121 ARTHUR HERZOG, VESCO: FROM WALL STREET TO CASTRO'S CUBA, THE RISE,
FALL, AND EXILE OF THE KING OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1987); Douglas Martin, Harry
L. Sears, 82, Politician and Courier for Vesco Cash, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2002, at B7.
122 In re Four Seasons Sec. Law Litig., 58 F.R.D. 19 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
123 The founder of the National Student Marketing Corp., Cortes W. Randell, was
convicted for his activities in fraudulently marketing the shares of that corporation.
Undeterred, he went on to further securities frauds, for which he was also convicted.
U.S. v. Mumford, 630 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1980).
124 SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
125 For a description of the stock market during this period, see BROOKS, supra note
99.
126 A special study of the securities industry had warned in 1963 that clearing and
settlement systems were inadequate to handle large volumes of securities transactions.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS,
H.R. Doc. No. 95, pt. 1, at 427 (1963). That warning went unheeded. Volume exploded
to 16 million shares, causing the failure of over 100 New York Stock Exchange firms.
JAMES E. BUCK, THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, THE FIRST 200 YEARS 190 (1992).
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securities held by a failed broker-dealer."' This created a new
moral hazard, since customers were relieved of the obligation to
monitor the financial health of their broker-dealer. 2 8 Account
insurance also led to more regulation in the form of an incredibly
complex set of regulations governing the net capital of broker-
dealers12 9 and their treatment of customer funds. 130 All of these
were created in the name of safeguarding the SIPC insurance
fund. 13 1 These regulatory "improvements" did nothing for the
market, which was cut nearly in half during the recession that
occurred in 1973-1974.132
The paperwork crisis and other problems led to even more
restrictive legislation in 1975.133 That legislation regulated clearing
and settlement activities, imposed more stringent regulation over
broker-dealer operations and sought to create a national "central
market" system. 134 The SEC devised this "central market" system
concept as a result of a study it directed of institutional traders. 135
This scheme posited that investors would be better served by a
centralized trading system that would assure that every investor
127 The Securities Investors Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa (1994). For
a description of the problems that led to the paper work crisis and the creation of SIPC,
see SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND
PRACTICES OF BROKERS AND DEALERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, H.R. Doc. No.
231, 92d Cong.., 1st Sess. (1971).
128 The efficiency of government account insurance is highly suspect. A study of
bank failures between 1945 and 1994 found that FDIC insurance did not reduce the costs
of bank failures and may have actually increased their costs. MELTZER, supra note 23, at
434.
129 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2002).
130 Id. at § 240.15c3-3.
131 For a description of the SEC's net capital and customer protection rules, see
MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 49, at chs. 4-5.
132 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE
AGE OF DERIVATIVES INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM (1970-2001) 26 (2002) [hereinafter III
MARKHAM].
133 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was extensively amended in 1975.
134 For a description of this legislation, see S. Rep. No. 94-75 (1975); H.R. Rep. No.
94-123 (1975).
135 Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the Future Structure of
the Securities Markets (1972). For a description of what the central market envisioned,
see SELIGMAN, supra note 79, at 499-505.
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received the "best" execution price available for orders.136 The
SEC never was able to articulate exactly how this concept would
work in practice, but it was able to convince congress that this
should be a national goal. 37 Although Congress mandated a
central market system in 1975,138 nothing much ever happened
except for some consolidated reporting and a link among exchange
specialists. 3 9
In seeking centralization, the SEC was actually fighting the
market fragmentation being brought about by the bifurcation of
institutional and retail traders. In reality, the institutional market
proved to be more nimble than the SEC, and it avoided a central
market that the SEC could throttle with regulation. The New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) sought its own national market system,
viz., a monopoly, by prohibiting its members from executing
transaction in listed securities other than on the floor of the
NYSE. 140 At the same time, the NYSE was seeking to prevent
136 Id. at 499.
137 Id. at 499-500.
138 See The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78k(a)(2) (2000).
139 The SEC sought to require a "universal message switch" that would have
required customer orders to be routed to the market with the best execution price. See
generally BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 101, at 47-49 (description of universal message
switch and Intermarket Trading System). The SEC was not able to mandate such a
system and instead agreed to the creation of the "Intermarket Trading System" under
which exchange specialists executed orders at the best price available on any other
exchange. Id at 48. This essentially meant that specialists on the regional exchanges
would have access to New York Stock Exchange quotes and could key off those quotes
instead of competing separately. Id.; see generally BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 101, at
47-48 (description of universal message switch and Intermarket Trading System);
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SEC ACTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS NATIONAL MARKET
SYSTEM ISSUES (Mar. 1990) (description of Central Market System issues). Most
recently, in 1999, the SEC was again raising the central market concept as electronic
communications networks siphoned off business from Nasdaq. Something called the
central limit order book was proposed but was not adopted. MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra
note 49, at § 13. However, the SEC chairman later dropped his support for such a
concept. See LEVITT, supra note 114, at 191-92, 199 (describing opposition to this
proposal).
140 NYSE Rule 390, later renumbered Rule 394, prohibited off-exchange
transactions in its securities by members. The SEC did attack that restriction in 1975 and,
after years of wrangling, the NYSE agreed not to apply its provisions to stocks listed
after April 26, 1979. BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 101, at 48. Some twenty years later,
the NYSE dropped that restriction for the grandfathered stocks as well. Michael
Schroder, SEC Clears NYSE to Let Firms Trade Big Board Stocks on Competing
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institutional investors from becoming members so that they could
not circumvent existing broker-dealer arrangements."' Those anti-
competitive actions, all sanctioned by the SEC, led to the creation
of the "third"' 42 and "fourth" markets. 143 Competition also survived
in the form of the Nasdaq market, an electronic quotation facility
that was begun in 1968144 and is now surpassing the NYSE in
trading volume. 1
45
Unfixing commissions in 1975 was a boon to the institutional
investor. 146 That action allowed large institutions to exercise their
bargaining power and demand nominal commissions. Small
investors had no such bargaining power and were left with higher
Markets, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2000, at C21.
141 The SEC aided this effort by passing a rule that required institutional exchange
members to send at least eighty percent of their transactions for execution to non-
affiliated entities. The SEC asserted that this restriction was needed to assure that
institutional exchange members were conducting primarily public securities businesses.
H.R. No. 94-123 at 57 (1975).
142 The third market involved broker-dealers that were not NYSE members
conducting transactions in NYSE listed stocks with institutions. Trading in the third
market in some stock reached levels as high as twenty-five percent by 1973. CHRIS
WELLES, THE LAST DAYS OF THE CLUB 53 (1975). The unfixing of commissions undercut
the third market substantially. By 1978, third market volume was less than three percent
of NYSE volume. LEO M. LOLL & JULIAN G. BUCKLEY, THE OVER-THE-COUNTER
SECURITIES MARKETS 168 (4th ed. 1981).
143 The fourth market involved institutions trading directly with each other without
the intermediation of an exchange or broker-dealer. Instinet developed an electronic
mechanism for matching such trades. By 1990, Instinet's volume was equal to about
thirteen percent of that of the NYSE. BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 101, at 19. In 2001,
Instinet volumes were reaching 350 million shares a day compared with NYSE volumes
of 1.2 billion shares (including institutional as well as retail trades). Compare shares
figures at http://www.instinet.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2001), with, share figures at
http://www.nyse.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2001). Institnet, however, was having its own
competition problems in 2003. Carlos Grande, Reuters Chiefs in Drive to Sell Job Cuts
Plan: Group to Focus on Market Information, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 19, 2003, at 17.
144 ROBBINS, supra note 101, at 210-11 (1966).
145 In year-to-date volume up to October 2001, NASD volume exceeded that of the
NYSE by about one-third. See http://www.nasd.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2001).
146 Fixed commissions had been a part of the securities industry since the signing of
the so-called "buttonwood agreement" in 1792. J. EDWARD MEEKER, THE WORK OF THE
STOCK EXCHANGE 63 (1930). By the 1970s there were numerous exceptions to the fixed
commission rules of the exchanges that were available to institutional investors. In May
of 1975, the SEC ordered all commission rates to be unfixed. H.R. Rep. No. 94-123, at
46 (1975).
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transactions costs than larger institutions. 47 Of course, small
investors could use the services of a discount broker at a lower
price, but in so doing they lost access to professional management
services and advice.'48 The small investor was also ceding time
and place advantages to the institutional investor in any market
timing transactions. At the same time, retail investors saw the
value of their stocks cut in half as the market plunged during the
1970s. 149
A series of scandals involving "questionable payments" to
foreign government officials from off-the-book slush funds of
public companies also arose in the 1970s. 5 A long list of public
companies made those bribes, but Lockheed was the leader,
handing out $30 million to government officials in Japan,
Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and numerous other countries.
Disclosure of those bribes led to the collapse of several
governments. 5 ' That scandal resulted in the passage of more full
disclosure requirements in the form of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977.152 That legislation prohibited the payment
of bribes by foreign issuers.'53 More importantly, it required public
companies to maintain accurate books and records, 154  a
requirement that proved to be a myth in the scandals now
surfacing.
Scandals involving "bond daddies" in various southern cities 55
and a funding crisis in New York City led to more regulation in
147 BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 101, at 9, n. 15.
148 For a description of the role and duties of discount brokers, see Renee Barnett,
Comments, Online Trading and the National Association of Securities Dealers'
Suitability Rule: Are Online Investors Adequately Protected?, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1089
(2000).
149 SELIGMAN, supra note 79, at 452.
150 At the time, there was no United States law prohibiting the bribing of foreign
officials, so these were called "questionable Payments."
151 III MARKHAM, supra note 132, at 23-24.
152 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
153 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2000).
154 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2000). A knowing violation of this requirement may be
prosecuted criminally. See id. § 78m(b)(4)-(5).
155 Robert Clow, From Beale Street to Wall Street, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June
1997, at 156, 157.
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the 1970s.'56 A Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board was
created by the 1975 amendments to the federal securities laws as a
means to bring full disclosure to municipal securities. That effort,
of course, did not prevent further scandals. Unregistered dealers
continued their sale of United States government securities
utilizing "repos. ' ' 157 The Arthur Andersen & Co. accounting firm
was found to have made misrepresentations in accounting
statements in connection with the failure of Drysdale Securities
Corp., one of the larger of these repo firms. Drysdale was running
a Ponzi scheme that cost investors $300 million.'58 The failure of
ESM Government Securities Inc. of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, cost
investors another $300 million and caused a run on deposits of
seventy-one Ohio thrifts. "The temporary closing of these
financial institutions in turn precipitated a sharp rise in the price of
gold and a decline in the value of the dollar."' 5 9 The failure of
156 Ann Judith Gellis, Municipal Securities Market: Same Problems-No Solutions,
21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 427 (1996). There were fiscal problems in New York City, which
had more than tripled its budget between 1965 and 1975. The City encountered difficulty
in selling one of its bond issues in 1974, and the banks conducting the City's
underwriting had to absorb the balance of the issue. Those banks advised the City that
they would no longer take down unsold offerings for their own accounts. The City's
credit was then running out. It could only sell half of a $900 million issue in 1975. The
SEC conducted an investigation of the City's bond sales and issued a report asserting
that the City had misled bond purchasers in failing to disclose the full extent of the City's
financial problems. This report played into the Mayoral race then underway, unseating
the incumbent mayor, Abraham D. Beame. In an effort to bail out the City, the New
York legislature created the Municipal Assistance Corporation (Big MAC) was created
for the purpose of issuing new bonds on the City's behalf. It too encountered difficulties
and was forced to raid State and City pension funds by selling them its bonds. See
generally Tron v. Condello, 427 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (describing MAC and
pension raid). The federal government at first refused aid, but after a famous newspaper
headline in the New York Daily News (President "Ford to City: Drop Dead"), aid was
given. Problems spread to State bonds as well, but recovery was eventually made. III
MARKHAM, supra note 132, at 48.
157 The daily trading volume for repo transactions grew to be six times greater than
that of the underlying Treasury securities. H.R. Rep. No. 102-722, pt. 1 (1992). For a
description of the problems in the repo market, see H.R. Rep. No. 99-258 (1985); S. Rep.
No. 99-426 (1986); Regulating Government Securities Dealers: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 99-38 (June 1985) [hereinafter Regulating
Government Securities Dealers].
158 Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 801 F.2d 13 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1066 (1987).
159 H.R. Rep. No. 102-722, pt. 1.
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Bevell, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp. caused
another $235 million in losses. 6 ° A new layer of regulation was
added with the enactment of the Government Securities Act of
1986. 161
This, once again, did not prevent future problems. A default of
a stunning proportions occurred 1982 when the Washington Public
Power Supply System (WPPS) defaulted on $2.25 billion in bonds
it had issued to build nuclear power plants.'62 Another massive
default occurred in 1994 when Orange County, California
announced large losses from speculative trading by its Treasurer.
It was the largest municipal bankruptcy in history. Losses
amounted to almost $1,000 for every man, woman, and child in
the county."'163 More problems followed with "pay-to-play"
underwriting abuses'6 4 and "yield burning to avoid IRS restrictions
on refunding yields."' 65
The savings and loan debacle of the 1980s witnessed the
failure of hundreds of those institutions. 66 Many of those S&Ls
had been taken over by criminals after regulatory controls first
nearly bankrupted those institutions and then opened the door for
fraud when changed in a way to encourage fraud by using federal
deposit insurance to obtain monies that could be spent on
speculative operations, yachts, jets, mansions, expensive art
works, and other executive necessities. 67 Most of the larger failed
160 Regulation of the Government Securities Market, Report by the Securities &
Exchange Commission to the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer
Protection and Finance of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 12 (June 20, 1985).
161 Government Securities Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-571, 100 Stat. 3208 (1986).
162 In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply System Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.
1987).
163 FRANK PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O.: BLOOD FN THE WATER ON WALL STREET 94
(1999).
164 Jon B. Jordan, The Regulation of "Pay-To-Play" and the Influence of Political
Contributions in the Municipal Securities Industry, 199 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 489.
165 See City of New Orleans v. Smith Barney, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6924
(E.D. La. 1999) (describing yield burning).
166 Over 700 S&Ls failed in a single year (1985). See III MARKHAM, supra note 132,
at 168 (describing these failures).
167 The looting was used for such things as a two-week culinary tour of France, a
$148,00 Christmas party, prostitutes, and the services of a number of Senators were
purchased (the infamous "Keating Five" that included the now reformist Senator John
McCain). Speculative investments included "trash-for-cash," i.e., worthless assets
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S&Ls were public companies with audited financial statements.'68
In a passage that would be much quoted in the wake of the Enron
and ensuing accounting failures, Federal District Court Judge and
former head of the SEC Enforcement Division, Stanley Sporkin,
asked in the case of one of the largest of the S&L failures: "where
were.., the accountants and attorneys .... ? [W]ith all the
professional talent involved (both accounting and legal) why [did
not] at least one professional . . . [blow] the whistle to stop the
overreaching that took place in this case." 169 Sporkin noted that
the head of that S&L had used scores of accountants and lawyers
in order to do the "right thing."'17 Full disclosure failed to prevent
this crisis, and accounting firms became the "scapegoats" for that
failure. 7' They paid $800 million in fees to defend themselves
from suits arising from the S&L crisis in 1992 alone. Ernst &
Young paid settlements of $400 million and Arthur Andersen paid
$79 million in settlements. 72
bought from the S&Ls own executives, and windmill farms. III MARKHAM, supra note
132, at 168-70. Many of these excesses would be repeated in the 1990s bubble right
down to the windmill farms that would become a favorite of the Enron Corp. LOREN
Fox, ENRON THE RISE AND FALL 131-32, 141 (2003).
168 The SEC required one S&L entity to restate its financial statements, resulting in
the reporting of a $107 million loss. That restatement was required because the SEC
disagreed with the accounting treatment recommended by Arthur Andersen & Co. for
certain transactions. A shareholders suit against the accounting firm was dismissed. In re
Fin. Corp. of America S'holders Litig., 796 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1986).
169 Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990). That
language would be used to justify the federal regulation of lawyers after the Enron
collapse. Where Were the Lawyers? Behind the Curtain Wearing Their Magic Caps,
Hearing on Accountability Issues: Lessons Learned From Enron's Fall, Testimony of
Susan P. Koniak, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 2, 2002) (testimony of Susan P. Koniak, Professor of Law,
Boston University School of Law).
170 Wall, 743 F. Supp. at 920.
171 Michael M. Neltner, Government Scapegoating, Duty to Disclose, and the S&L
Crisis: Can Lawyers and Accountants Avoid Liability in the Savings and Loan
Wilderness?, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 655 (1993).
172 III MARKHAM, supra note 132, at 168-70. Lawyers were also targeted as failed
policeman and scapegoats. The assets of the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays &
Handler were seized by the government until that firm agreed to pay out $41 million in
fines. Two other law firms agreed to large settlements: Jones, Day, Reaves and Pogue
($51 million) and Paul Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison ($40 million). Id at 172; see
also O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994) (government attack on another
law firm).
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Banking failures like the Bank of Credit and Commerce
International (BCCI) were blamed on the auditors. That bank was
later found to be one giant criminal enterprise that bank regulators
had permitted to operate globally. 173 Accountants also failed to
unravel the accounting shell game utilized by the Penn Square
Bank in Oklahoma to sell $2.5 billion in loan participations to
other banks. The failure of that shopping center bank would cause
a national crisis. One victim, the giant Continental Bank in
Chicago, which had its own auditors examine the Penn Square
loans would have to be nationalized by the government. 174
Full disclosure looked even more like a bad joke with the
insider trading scandals of the 1980s that involved the likes of
Ivan Boesky. 175 Sanctions were later strengthened after a series of
scandals, but insider trading continues. 176 Investors poured $10
billion into penny stocks. 177 Hundreds of thousands of those
investors were then thoroughly swindled by the likes of Blinder
Robinson and First Jersey Securities. 178 Additional legislation was
173 PETER TRUELL & LARRY GURWIN, FALSE PROFITS: THE INSIDE STORY OF BCCI,
THE WORLD'S MOST CORRUPT FINANCIAL EMPIRE 315 (1992).
174 PHILLIP L. ZWEIG, BELLY UP: THE COLLAPSE OF THE PENN SQUARE BANK 247
(1985).
175 For a description of those scandals, see DAVID A. VISE & STEVE COLL, EAGLE ON
THE STREET (1991). A chilling side note to these scandals was the plea bargaining by
Ivan Boesky and the unpopularity of junk bonds and related merger activity that
launched the SEC and the U.S. Attorney's Office in New York on a vendetta against
Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham Lambert, sending him to prison with a record fine
and destroying the firm. See III MARKHAM, supra note 132, at 126 (describing this
prosecution); JESSE KORNBLUTH, HIGHLY CONFIDENT: THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF
MICHAEL MILKEN (1992). Other claimed excesses of this era were the junk bonds used to
finance the merger mania then occurring. For an attack on Milken and the junk bond
market, see CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATOR'S BALL: THE JUNK-BOND RAIDERS AND THE
MAN WHO STAKED THEM (1988). For criticism of leveraged buyouts use to fund
acquisitions, see GEORGE ANDERS, MERCHANTS OF DEBT, KKR AND THE MORTGAGING OF
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1992); BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE
GATE, THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO (1990).
176 See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2000); Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t-1, 78u-1
(2000).
177 Joseph 1. Goldstein & L. Delane Cox, Penny Stock Markups and Markdowns, 85
Nw. L. Rev. 676 (1991).
178 Some of these schemes, such as the blind pools, were apparently borrowed from
the South Sea Bubble in the 1720s. III MARKHAM, supra note 132, at 148-149.
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enacted to deal with those penny stock frauds, 179 but they would
be succeeded with but little interruption by the "microcap" pump
and dump schemes of the 1990s. 8°
The stock market crash of 1987, however, proved once again
that the SEC and full disclosure do not stabilize a market or
prevent precipitous declines; economics is responsible for those
tasks. The 1987 decline set a new record for the most severe one-
week decline in history, exceeding that of the 1929 crash. 81 The
SEC blamed that event on the speculative excesses of commodity
futures traders operating on low margins in stock index futures
contracts. 8 2 The commodity futures markets, however, according
to the SEC's own reports, had become "synthetic" stock markets
and were being used to price stocks.183 In other words, the
commodity markets were viewed to be more efficient than the
stock markets. How could this be possible when there was no full
disclosure concept in the commodity markets?184
The intrusive SEC regulatory structure periodically caused
complaint and some half-hearted efforts were made to ease that
burden. Securities litigation had become an industry into itself.
Battalions of lawyers were filing suit immediately after any dip in
the price of a public security. Settlements were extorted from
those companies that provided little benefit to shareholders, but
179 Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931.
180 To cite a few examples: The SEC sued eighty-two defendants in August of 1999
for microcap fraud. Another eighty-five were indicted for manipulating stock prices in
1996. The A.S. Goldman firm was defrauding investors of $100 million, and Duke &
Co. was another fraudulent operation. III MARKHAM, supra note 132, at 343. One
federal undercover operation resulted in the arrest of 120 individuals involved in a pump
and dump scheme. Kara Scannell, Wolfson is Convicted in "Pump and Dump'" Penny-
Stock Scheme, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2003, at C1.
181 Jerry W. Markham and Rita Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of 1987-The
United States Looks at New Recommendations, 76 GEO. L. J. 1993 (1988).
182 Id. at 2011.
183 SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N Dtv. OF MKT. REGULATION, THE OCTOBER 1987
MARKET BREAK, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8 (1988).
184 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the federal agency charged with
regulating the commodity futures industry, had rejected such a concept early in its
history. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, A Study of the Nature, Extent and
Effects of Futures Trading by Persons Possessing Material Non-Public Information
(Sept. 1986).
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paid large sums to the lawyers. Abuses in litigation included the
use of "professional plaintiffs" to bring class action lawsuits.185
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995186 and the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998187sought to
restrict over-reaching by lawyers in those private actions. Critics
claim that reform efforts to curb abusive litigation have had little
effect. 8 Indeed, the number of securities related lawsuits more
than doubled in 2001 over the prior year.1 89
The Market Bubble
The Run Up
The SEC had not stopped fraud, scandals, and market failures
during its tenure. That might be forgiven as an impossible task.
The real stress test was whether it would prevent the excesses that
would lead to a bubble such as that in the 1920s. The SEC failed
that measure miserably. The market run up at the end of the
century had many eerie similarities to that of 1929.9' Even
185 Jordan Eth & Daniel Drosman, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act:
Five Years Young, 34 SEC. & COMMD. REG. REP. 153, 157 (July 2001).
186 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737.
187 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 327.
188 Id. Compare with, Common Sense Legal Reform Act, Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on
Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 73-86 (1995) (statistics suggesting that there was no
inordinate increase in the number of class action lawsuits involving securities claims).
189 What's News, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2002, at Al. Most securities customers were
relegated to arbitration proceedings where their claims involved a broker-dealer. Despite
intensive regulation by the SEC of those broker-dealers and an incredibly complex net
capital rule, a General Accounting Office Study found that more than one-half of NASD
arbitration awards were uncollectible. Marilyn Blumberg Cane & Marc J. Greenspon,
Securities Arbitration: Bankrupt, Bothered and Bewildered, 7 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN.
131, 136 (2002) (describing GAO findings).
190 The 1990s was said to be one of history's "euphoric speculative bubbles." E.S.
Browning, Greenspan Warns of Bubble, and Markets Keep Rising, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17,
2000, at Cl; Trapped by the Bubble, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 1999, at 17. For a
description of the market bubble in the 1920s, see KLEIN, supra note 21. Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan had claimed for a number of years that a bubble was
underway, using the famous descriptive term "irrational exuberance." III MARKHAM,
supra note 132, at 315.
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Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan's blundering efforts to
squelch the market by ratcheting up interest rates smacked of past
errors forgotten.'9' Of course one should probably ask exactly
what is wrong with a market bubble before trying to squelch it at
all costs. The market rise in the 1920s was a reflection of a
revolution in communications and transportation. The radio,
motion pictures, and automobiles spurred the economy to new
heights and changed lives forever. 192 In the 1990s, the computer
and the Internet revolutionized society in ways that are too
numerous to even catalogue.' 93 Why anyone would want to curb
those advances escapes at least this casual observer.
The stock market mania in the 1920s that was induced by the
advances of that period did result in problems with speculators
who were overextended and trading on margin.'94 The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 was adopted to prevent that problem from
191 The Federal Reserve Board had kept interest rates low during the 1920s in order
to assist England in returning to the gold standard. Then when the market appeared over-
heated, the Fed ratcheted up rates. I1 MARKHAM, supra note 67, at 150-53. Fed
Chairman Alan Greenspan led an effort to stop the market bubble by several rapid and
crippling interest rate increases. That worked, and the bull market turned into a disaster
for investors. Greenspan then reversed himself by dropping rates to the lowest level in
decades, but it was too late, the damage had been done. III MARKHAM, supra note 132, at
349-353; see also Peter G. Gosselin, Greenspan Legacy is Wobbling, L.A. TIMES, July 8,
2001, at AI (describing actions of Federal Reserve Board); Lawrence Kudlow, Golden
Years?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2003, at A16 (Greenspan's efforts to smash the stock
market and curb inflation now threaten the economy with deflation.).
192 The stock of the RCA company was a particular target of speculators and
manipulative pools. That company, however, was truly a speculative opportunity. It was
not smoke and bubbles. The industry saw radio sales increase by 2000,000 units between
1928 and 1929. RCA saw sales of $176 million in 1929 with profits approaching $16
million, a tidy sum in those days. II MARKHAM, supra note 67, at 150. The airplane
industry was also getting off the ground, so to speak, during this era.
193 Shopping online, online banking and trading, instant communications with
Blackberries and cell phones, word processing, and B2B connections have changed the
daily lives of nearly everyone. By the end of the last century more than half of all
Americans had a computer in their homes, and Americans were spending more on
computers than televisions. III MARKHAM, supra note 132, at 289. More than half the
United States was using the Web by the beginning of 2002. What's News, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 4, 2002, at Al.
194 For a description of the concerns raised by margin in the securities industry, see
MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 49, at §8:2. Interestingly, the Federal Reserve Board
subsequently concluded that margin regulation should not be viewed as a significant part
of the federal regulatory structure. Nevertheless, little was done to remove those
controls. Id. at §8:3.
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occurring in the future.'95 Margin trading, however, would be
resurrected by customers at day trading shops in the 1990s. At one
point there were 400,000 day-traders.'96 That was a large number,
but it was one that was outmatched by the margin accounts of the
1920s. ' Nevertheless, this speculation raised regulatory alarms.' 98
The initial public offerings (IPOs) of the dotcom companies at
the end of the last century were reflective of the excesses of the
1920s. These highly speculative Internet operations became "hot
issues," which quickly traded in multiples of their offering price.'99
Many of those enterprises just as quickly crashed. For example,
the price of Scient rose from $10 to $133 before falling to $1.81.200
195 See Jerry W. Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the Commodity Futures
Industry-History and Theory, 64 TEMPLE L. REV. 59, 101 (1991) (describing federal
margin regulation of securities and comparing it with the absence of regulation in the
commodity futures industry).
196 The day traders usually found themselves on the losing end of a large number of
trades, often conducted on margin. Ruth Simon, Day-Trading Firms' Moves that Skirt
Margin Lending Rules are Being Probed, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1999, at Cl; Edward
Wyatt, Day Traders are Formidable Market Force, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1999, at Cl.
Most day traders lost money. Michael Schroeder, Day-trading Firms Rebuked by Group
of State Regulators Over Marketing, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1999, at A26; Rebecca
Buckman, Report on Day-Trading Firm's Accounts Finds Nearly Three-Fourths in the
Red, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1999, at C15. The NASD and the NYSE adopted special
margin requirements and risk disclosures for day traders and retail customers. Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 44009, 2001 WL 197851 (Feb. 27, 2001); Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 44223, 2001 WL 431540 (Apr. 26, 2001). The SEC also
charged some large day trading firms with manipulating stocks on the Nasdaq market.
Susanne Craig, Several Pioneers of Day Trading to Pay Big Fines, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15,
2003, at C1. The number of day traders was shrinking in 2002. Aaron Elstein, Yes, Day
Traders Still Exist, They Just Keep a Lower Profile, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2002, at D4.
197 There were about 600,000 accounts trading on margin in 1929 or about forty
percent of brokerage accounts. II MARKHAM, supra note 67, at 150. The number of
margin accounts today is uncertain, but the widely popular cash management account
created by Merrill Lynch and widely copied by other institutions has a margin feature
that allows investors to use their accounts as margin accounts that create a secured line
of credit. Id. at 7.
198 As if he were, indeed, an old actor in an even older movie, Alan Greenspan
expressed concern during the market bubble of the 1990s that margin trading might be
contributing to speculative excesses. III MARKHAM, supra note 132, at 350.
199 See generally JOHN CASSIDY, DOT.CON, THE GREATEST STORY EVER SOLD 29
(2002).
200 Leah Beth Ward, E-Consulting Firms Sinking in Shakeout; Privately Held Area
Companies Fare Better, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 6, 2001, at F 1. Red Hat rose by
$100 to $151 before dropping to $5.22. Joseph Menn, Linux Firms Still Searching for
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Priceline.com stock fell from $162 to $1.12.2°1 Yahoo stock
dropped ninety-two percent. 2  Stock values at Cisco Systems
were reduced by $148 billion.20 3 Other big losers were EMC
Networks, Oracle, Nortel Networks, Merck, and General
Electric. 0 4 Nasdaq stocks lost seventy percent of their value, and
hundreds of companies were dropped from trading in that market
following the collapse of market prices in 2000.205 Estimates have
ranged as high as $8.5 trillion as to the market value lost on the
Nasdaq during the market reverse that began in 2000.206
Some comparable figures are available from 1929. Stocks
listed on the NYSE dropped in value from $90 billion to $16
billion, a drop of over eighty percent. 207 The investment trusts of
that era were closed end funds that owned many speculative
securities.20 8 The fall 'in their share prices would have done a
dotcom company proud. For example, the Goldman Sachs Trading
Corporation saw its share prices fall from $326 to $1.75.209 The
Blue Ridge Corp. stock price went from $100 to $3, and the
American Founders Corp. shares dropped from $30 to 38 cents.10
Scandals
The stock analyst scandals that followed the market collapse in
this century had overtones of abuses from the 1920s.21 Harry
Success, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, at C1.
201 Steven Syre & Charles Stein, Boston Capital; Net Findings: Travel Works,
Groceries Don't, BOSTON GLOBE, July 11, 2001, at C6.
202 Year in Life of Richard Li, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (LEXIS), Aug. 17,
2001, at Al.
203 Floyd Norris, After Two-year Drop In Markets, Calendar Turns on Note of
Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2002, at Al.
204 Id.
205 Vincent Boland, Nasdaq Changes 15 Stocks, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 16,
2002, at 26.
206 Cutting Interest Rates Won't Halt Deflation, POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 5, 2002, at
B6.
207 11 MARKHAM, supra note 67, at 155.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 See generally Burton G. Malkiel, The Great Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14,
2002, at A16 (describing analysts' conflicts now existing on Wall Street).
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Blodget, an analyst at Merrill Lynch, described one stock he had
publicly praised as a "piece of junk" in an internal email.212 After
the New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, conducted an
investigation of Blodget that revealed conflicts of interest in
Merrill Lynch's research department, it agreed to pay $100 million
in fines to the State of New York.213 Internal emails had shown
that firm analysts were privately disparaging company stocks,
calling some "crap" while publicly recommending those shares.214
Mary Meeker, an analyst at Morgan Stanley, was given the title of
"queen of the net" for hyping IPO internet stock offerings that her
firm was underwriting.15 The State of Massachusetts claimed that
analysts employed at Credit Suisse First Boston were touting
stocks that they were privately disparaging in order to obtain
investment banking business. 16 Jack Grubman, an analyst at
Salomon Smith Barney, was alleged to have pumped
telecommunications stocks so that his firm could obtain their
underwriting business.217 Even juicier was the charge that
Grubman had been induced to upgrade his rating on AT&T by
Sandy Weill, the head of Citigroup, in order to please that client.1 8
The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 had
212 Patrick McGeehan, E-Mail Gaps May Mean Fines for Big Firms, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 2002, at C4.
213 Id.
214 Joshua Chaffin & Gary Silverman, Merrill Escapes Severe Penalty, FIN. TIMES
(LONDON), May 22, 2002, at 1.
215 CASSIDY, supra note 199, at 206-17.
216 Susanne Craig, Massachusetts Claims CSFB Stock Reports Led Investors Astray,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2002, at Cl.
217 See generally Randall Smith & Susanne Craig, Will Grubman Case Tone Down
the Exaggeration by Analysts?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2002, at Cl; Charles Gasparino,
Salomon's Grubman Resigns: NASD Finds "Spinning" at Firm, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16,
2002, at Al; Charles Gasparino, Salomon Agrees to Settle Stock-Hype Case, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 24, 2002, at C 1.
218 Allegedly, Citigroup made a $1 million donation to a preschool (92nd Street Y)
in order to assist Grubman's children obtaining entrance into that elite school. Grubman
later claimed that he had made the story up and that the donation was not for the purpose
of having him report favorably on AT&T. Emily Nelson & Laurie P. Cohen, Why Jack
Grubman Was So Keen to Get His Twins into the Y, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2002, at Al.
Regulators decided not to charge Weill, but Grubman was barred from the securities
industry and fined $15 million. Money & Business; Rogues of the Year, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Dec. 30, 2002, at 33.
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sought to preempt much state securities regulation, 219 but state
attorney generals were simply ignoring that statute.220 Indeed, they
have taken over much of the regulation of securities, further
marginalizing the SEC. A wolf pack of forty state regulators began
a joint investigation of the malpractices of stock analysts and of
their recommendations of stocks for IPOs that were being
underwritten by their firms.221 This resulted in a spectacular $1.4
billion joint settlement with several large investment banks.222
Among other things, the settlement sought to require those finns
to fund "independent" research for their customers, whatever that
might mean.223 Citigroup alone paid $450 million of the $1.4
billion industry settlement.224
It is unclear, however, what laws were broken and whether the
219 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110
Stat. 3416.
220 The attorney general wolf packs have actually taken over much regulation of the
securities industry in the aftermath of the Enron scandal. Jerry W. Markham, Super-
Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and Derivatives Regulation in the
United States, Great Britain and Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. - (forthcoming 2003).
Even before the bubble burst, Eliot Spitzer's predecessor as the New York Attorney
General had been conducting investigations of microcap fraud. State securities
administrators also brought over 100 enforcement actions in July of 1998 in a
coordinated effort to stop market fraud. III MARKHAM, supra note 132, at 260-61.
221 Michael Schroeder, States' Wall Street Probes Bog Down, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13,
2002, at C5. Analysts conflicts had been of concern after the stock market crash of 1929.
Section 17(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) was enacted to preclude
secret compensation or benefits from issuers to analysts in order to induce them to tout
the issuer's stock. This did not remove analysts' conflicts. Rather, a market solution
appeared in the form of the discount broker. Charles Schwab built one of the largest
broker-dealer firms in the country on the basis of his claims that research in the full
service firms was conflicted and did not justify the higher commissions charged by those
firms employing analysts. Charles Schwab & Co., however, later found it necessary to
provide advice to customers. JOHN KADOR, CHARLES SCHWAB, HOW ONE COMPANY
BEAT WALL STREET AND REINVENTED THE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY, 23-24, 98 (2002); see
also BENJAMIN COLE, THE PIED PIPERS OF WALL STREET: How ANALYSTS SELL YOU
DOWN THE RIVER (2001) (describing analysts' shortcomings).
222 This was a joint settlement with state and federal securities regulators, leading to
strife and competition for the headlines. See generally Charles Gasparino, Analyst Pact is
Held up by Words, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2003, at Cl (describing tiff over language in
settlement report). Other firms joined in the settlement. Piper Jaffray Joins Settlement; to
Pay $25M, Make Changes, 35 SEC. & COMMD. REG. REP. 1, 11 (Jan. 6, 2003).
223 Randall Smith, Regulators Set Accord With Securities Firms, But Some Issues
Persist, WALL ST. J., December 23, 2002, at Cl.
224 Id.
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settlement provided anything of value to the market. 25 In any
event, these were the same conflicts and abuses that were at the
heart of the scandals that followed the stock market crash of 1929.
Congressional hearings that led to the adoption of the federal
securities laws revealed that investment counselors were being
paid to tout stocks and newspaper reporters were bribed to carry
favorable reports on particular stocks.226
Share "spinning" schemes in the 1990s looked strangely like
the preferred lists used by J.P. Morgan in the 1920s. 22' Goldman
Sachs was under scrutiny by congressional investigators after it
was disclosed that executives of twenty-one large U.S. companies
had received shares in IPO hot issues from Goldman Sachs
Group. 28 Those shares were allocated in order to induce those
executives to send their firms' business to Goldman.229 Frank
225 See generally Roy Smith, Attacking Wall Street With a Blunt Instrument, FrN.
TIMES (London), Jan. 7, 2003, at 13 (criticizing the settlement).
226 11 MARKHAM, supra note 67, at 144.
227 Id. at 145-56. The practice of "spinning" involves the allocation by investment
bankers of shares in hot IPOs to officers of clients in order to gain their underwriting
business. See generally Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam, Buddy System, How a
Technology-Banking Star Doled Out Shares of Hot IPOs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2002, at
Al (describing these transactions). J.P. Morgan and other investment bankers used
"preferred lists" in the 1920s to allocate hot issues to clients, friends, and persons of
influence. Those practices were condemned at length in the hearings that led to the
enactment of the federal securities laws. I MARKHAM, supra note 67, at 145-56.
228 Randall Smith, Goldman Gave Hot IPO Shares to Top Executives of its Clients,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2002, at Al. The SEC had been investigating such practices since at
least 1997. Michael Siconolfi, SEC, NASD Begin Probes of lPO 'Spin'Accounts, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 13, 1997, at A3.
229 Id. The government had attacked the underwriting process for securities in the
1950s. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Seeking to require
competitive bidding for shares, the Justice Department charged several leading
underwriters with monopoly practices. Id. Federal District Court Judge Harold Medina
threw that case out of court. Id. The bursting of the bubble on Wall Street at the end of
the century opened the door for renewed government attacks, including investigations of
"laddering," i.e., IPO allocations conditioned on the purchase of additional shares in the
after market. See, e.g., Randall Smith, IPO 'Laddering' Case Expands, WALL ST. J., Feb.
26, 2003, at Cl. A district court denied motions to dismiss claims against underwriters
for more than 300 IPOs. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 21 MC 92 (SAS), 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2373 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2003). The plaintiffs charged that the
defendants manipulated those underwritings by requiring additional purchases in the
aftermarket for those given IPO allocations and by requiring a payment of profits for
sales into the aftermarket. Id.
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Quattrone at Credit Suisse First Boston allocated IPOs to private
clients valued at over $200 million, making them profits on
average of $1 million each. Sales by insiders of the stocks of
their companies in recent years, even while those securities were
being touted to the public, mock similar sales by corporate titans
of yesteryear.23'
The collapse of the Enron Corp. and the bankruptcy of
WorldCom, Inc. had their match in the 1930s with the failure of
the Insull empire of holding companies, the massive fraud by Ivar
Kruger at the Swedish Match Company and the fall of the
Alleghany Corp. that had been put together by the Van Sweringen
brothers.232 Thoughtful individuals viewing this history might want
to ask what exactly federal regulation of securities has
accomplished and at what cost to those being regulated, as well as
to those who mistakenly thought they were given some measure of
protection by the SEC's system of full disclosure.
Market touts flourished on the Internet, but their pump and
dump schemes varied little from those of the unregulated markets
of the 1920s. One needs only have read the daily business news to
find an announcement that the government was prosecuting yet
another stock swindle during the market run up in the 1990S.233
Usually, small, unsophisticated customers were the victims of
230 Robert Clow & Scott Morrison, 'Frank's friends' made up to $400m, FIN.
TIMES, March 15-16, 2003, at 17.
231 Daniel Altman, When Insider's Sales are a Long-Term Plan, N.Y. TIMES, May
19, 2002, § 3, at 1. Ken Lay, the head of the Enron Corp., was selling millions of dollars
of the company's stock even while he was urging employees to load up on that stock. Id.
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78p) was adopted after it
was discovered that Albert Wiggin, the head of the Chase National Bank, had been
selling that bank's stock short even while it was being sold to investors through a bank
affiliate. II MARKHAM, supra note 67, at 204. In another throwback to the days of
Wiggin, Samuel Waksal, the indicted insider trader in the Martha Stewart scandal and
former head of ImClone Systems, Inc. bought put options on his company's stock before
negative announcements, allowing him to make profits. Kara Scannell, Waksal Made
Money Betting Against ImClone, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2003, at C 1.
232 II MARKHAM, supra note 67, at 175-76.
233 David Barboza, et al., Penny Stock Fraud is Billion-Dollar Game, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 1999, at Al. High pressure, "boiler room" sales operations, Ponzi schemes and
manipulations were endemic in the 1990s. Id. Between 1996 and 1998, over 1,000
telemarketers were charged with fraud in their sales operations. What's News-World
Wide, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1998, at Al. Microcap fraud was amounting to $2 billion a
year. Barboza, supra, at Al.
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those frauds.234 They were fleeced for billions of dollars.235
Indeed, state securities administrator's estimated that securities
fraud was costing investors in the United States some $1 million
per hour.236 This number bears comparison to the $25 billion in
worthless securities sold to investors in the 1920s.237
Insider trading continued. The former chairman of Cendant
was indicted for selling $11 million of that company's stock just
before its announcement of massive accounting irregularities.238
Dr. Samuel Waksall, the founder of ImClone, was arrested on June
12, 2002 and charged with insider trading in the stock of his
company. 239 The doctor sold stock after he learned that the Food
and Drug Administration had refused to review an application for
a cancer drug of ImClone.24 ° Martha Stewart, the house and garden
doyenne, was also being investigated because she had sold stock
in ImClone and was a friend of Waksall.241 Martha Stewart's
Company, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., saw its share
price fall when news of Martha's Stewart's sale was announced.
Stewart's broker's assistant pled guilty to charges for his role in
this affair.242
A porno film actress pled guilty to insider trading.243 The
actress, Kathryn Gannon, who used the stage name of Marilyn
Starr, had been tipped by James J. McDermott, Jr., the former head
of Keefe, Bryette & Woods.24 4 He also pled guilty to securities
234 See, e.g., Evan Perez, Drive is Launched on Investment Fraud Targeting
Florida's Retirees, Foreigners, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2001, at C16. One enforcement
sweep involved investment schemes directed at elderly investors. Id.
235 SIEBERT, supra note 114, at 191.
236 Id
237 I1 MARKHAM, supra note 67, at 179.
238 Former Official Allegedly Sold Stock Shortly Before Cedant Fraud Unveiled, 34
SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1994 (2002), available at http://subscript.bna.com/
samples/cad.nsf/cbeebd717c2395bb85256b5200778094/83d 140f5c073aaa085256c98005
acf5c?OpenDocument.
239 Geeta Anand et al., Biotech Bust, ImClone 's Ex-CEO Arrested, Charged with
Insider Trading, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2002, at Al.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Guilty Plea in Stock-Tip Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2002, at CIO.
244 Id.
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fraud.24 5 An individual pleaded guilty to insider trading through
tips that he obtained from a postal service employee. 246 The postal
service employee was telephoning him information from the
column "Inside Wall Street" in Business Week. 47 The postal
service employee would read him the column when the magazine
reached the facility in advance of being distributed to the public.248
The SEC's full disclosure and equal access to information regime
was proving to be porous indeed.
Internet fraud was another growth area. 249 The SEC assigned
200 lawyers to a cyber task force to police the Internet and dozens
of cases were brought against those committing fraud.250 But fraud
continued and was working its way down into the high schools.
25
'
A seventeen year old student, Benjamin Snyder, was charged by
the SEC with planting false new stories on the Internet where he
posted price of a stock.252 He was not the youngest offender.
Jonathan Lebed of Cedar Grove, New Jersey, was sued by the
SEC when he was fifteen.253 That youngster had to repay $285,000
of gains 254 In another case, the SEC charged some Georgetown
law students and one of their mothers with committing securities
fraud on the Internet. 5
Market integrity was in question. The SEC's "Large Firm
Project" found that twenty-five percent of broker-dealer branch
office examinations resulted in referrals for enforcement action.256
245 Id.
246 Guilty Plea in Postal Case, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2002, at C7.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 See e.g. Alex Berenson, 2 Accused of Using E-Mail to Commit Stock Fraud,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2000, at C2. Crime on the Internet was estimated at $266 million
annually at the end of the century. Magia Pesola & Louise Kehoe, Cybercrime in US
Soars to Dollars 266m, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2000, at World News: U.S. & Canada, 4,
available at LEXIS, News Library, FIN. TIMES File.
250 I MARKHAM, supra note 67, at 259-61, 293-94, 344-45.
251 Judith Bums, Teen Settles Matter with SEC of Scheme to Raise Stock Price,
WALL ST. J., June 26, 2002, at C3.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 III MARKHAM, supra note 132, at 345.
256 Books and Records Requirements for Brokers and Dealers Under the Securities
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State regulators found that customers were being defrauded of
billions of dollars each year as the result of sales practice
violations by broker-dealers, all of whom were subject to elaborate
regulation under the federal securities laws.25 7 Robert Morgenthau,
the district attorney in Manhattan, used the Martin Act to
prosecute pump-and-dump and other Internet dotcom stock trading
scandals. 25 8 The Wall Street Journal was periodically publishing
the names of hundreds of individuals and firms being disciplined
by the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq.2 19 Despite this
incredible list of violators, those institutions were themselves
criticized for failing to police their markets. 26' Nasdaq market
makers were accused of colluding with each other to make non-
competitive quotes. 26' Eight floor brokers on the NYSE were
charged with criminal violations for front running customer
orders.262
These problems all occurred under a vigilant and aggressive
SEC that had been administering a complete and complex set of
regulations mandating full disclosure.263 An activist and very pro-
regulation chairman guided that agency during the height of the
market run up, under a decidedly pro-regulation administration.264
Exchange Act of 1934, 66 Fed. Reg. 55818, 55828 (Nov. 2, 2001) (codified as amended
at 17 CFR pts. 240 and 242).
257 Id.
258 Jerry Markon & Charles Gasparino, For Corporate-Crime Fighters, No Law is
Old, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2002, at C1.
259 See, e.g., Cary Szafranski, NYSE Regulators Discipline Companies, People,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2001, at B7H.
260 Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 15(b) and 21C of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Findings of the Commission, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-40900 (Jan. 11, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/admin/34-40900.txt (on file with North Carolina Journal of International Law
and Commercial Regulation).
261 Id.
262 MARKHAM, supra note 67, at 261-62. Another front running scandal broke out on
the Exchange floor in April 2003. Kate Kelly & Susanne Craig, Big Board is Probing
Specialists for Possible 'Front- Running,'WALL ST. J., April 17, 2003, at Al.
263 LEVITT supra note 114.
264 See generally LEVITT, supra note 114. The chairman wrote a book defending
himself. Id. He blamed Enron and other accounting scandals on industry lobbying,
Republicans, and "New Democrats" who blocked even more intrusive regulation he
favored. Id.
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Full disclosure did not prevent the bubble or the ensuing scandals.
Indeed, the Enron and telecom implosions that grew from the
accounting fraud on that chairman's watch were nurtured by the
full disclosure environment he was so vigorously advocating and
expanding. Investors were led to believe, falsely, that they were
protected by, and assured of, full disclosure under the federal
securities laws. They received no such thing. To the contrary, they
were simply cheated by their government's totally unrealistic and
false promises of such protection.
Accountants as Policeman
An early SEC chairman, William 0. Douglas, New Dealer and
future Supreme Court justice, declared that the SEC should be "the
pace setter in the accounting field. 2 65 Full disclosure under the
federal securities laws hinges on the accuracy of corporate
accounting statements. The SEC, however, does not have the
resources to assure that accuracy.26 6 To remedy that shortcoming,
the SEC has sought to convert accountants into policeman.2 67 In
the first instance, this was done through industry self-regulation
that was overseen by the SEC - a model that agency uses for
exchange regulation.268 There are two prongs to this self-
regulatory structure: one is generally accepted auditing standards
(GAAS) and the second is generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP).269 The first prong, GAAS, have been produced
by the Auditing Standards Board of the American Institute of
265 MURPHY, supra note 108, at 137.
266 See generally WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (James
Allen ed., 1940).
267 Id.
268 Id. Self-regulation has been described by Supreme Court Justice William 0.
Douglas, a former SEC chairman, as "letting the exchanges take the leadership with
Government playing a residual role. Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak,
behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would
never have to be used." Id. Self-regulation has not been a success in assuring full
disclosure. Instead, it has made a violator out of hundreds of individuals and firms in the
business. This is best exemplified by the periodic list of NASD and disciplinary actions
published in the Wall Street Journal. See, e.g., Michael Gerdes, NYSE Disciplines Firms,
Individuals, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2003, at B1 IA. Something is wrong with a regulatory
system in which mass numbers of participants are violators.
269 See generally, DOUGLAS, supra note 266.
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Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).270 The AICPA is a private
professional organization of certified public accountants (CPAs),
i.e., accountants passing rigorous examinations conducted by state
boards of accountancy in order to assure proficiency in the
profession.71 CPAs are the accountants qualified to conduct audits
and certify that a corporation's books and records are properly
prepared.272
270 One court has described the nature and application of GAAS as follows:
The GAAS include 10 broadly phrased sets of standards and general
principles that guide the audit function. They are classified as
general standards, standards for fieldwork, and standards of
reporting. General Standard No. I provides: "The examination is to
be performed by a person or persons having adequate technical
training as ... auditor[s]." General Standard No. 3 provides: "Due
professional care is to be exercised in the performance of the
examination and the preparation of the report." Standard of
Fieldwork No. 2 provides: "A sufficient understanding of the internal
control structure is to be obtained to plan the audit and to determine
the nature, timing, and extent of tests to be performed." The
generality of these statements is somewhat mitigated by the
Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS), which are periodic
interpretations of the standards issued by the Auditing Standards
Board of the AICPA.... For example, SAS-55, which relates to
internal financial control structure, includes steps to be followed in
understanding and testing accounting control systems in relation to
information provided in financial statements.... The GAAS Guide,
a commonly used summary of GAAS, that purports to integrate and
comprehensively restate pertinent auditing standards, includes 140
major sections and more than 1,000 pages.
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 750 (Cal. 1992) (citations omitted).
271 Id. The Institute of Accountants and Bookkeepers was founded in New York in
1882. It gave examinations and certificates to those demonstrating proficiency in
accounting. I MARKHAM, supra note 51, at 333. In 1896, New York adopted legislation
that provided for state certification of public accountants who could demonstrate their
expertise in the profession. THOMAS L. HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM, CORPORATIONS
AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 1147 (2003). A predecessor of the AICPA, the
American Institute of Accountants, had published a guide entitled "Uniform
Accounting" in 1917 that contained guidelines on what steps should be taken in audits. 11
MARKHAM, supra note 67, at 91.
272 Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d at 750. One court has noted that:
Inherent in rendering an audit opinion is the recognition that financial
statements cannot 'precisely' or 'exactly' present financial position, results of
operations and cash flows. Such precision is unattainable. Consequently, an
accountant's opinion that "the financial statements fairly present the financial
condition of the Company in accordance with generally accepted accounting
[Vol. 28
RETHINKING FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
The second prong of self-regulation is the concept of GAAP
that falls under the oversight of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB). z73 GAAP seeks to assure that the
accounting methodology properly discloses the company's
financial activities and condition.274 GAAPs are actually practices
that are generally accepted by the accounting profession in
determining appropriate methodology or how to account for
particular items .2" GAAPs may be legend and lore, rather than
written principles.276 GAAPs must, however, be consistently
applied.277 The FASB may issue written statements specifying a
particular GAAP standard. 278 Rule 203 of the AICPA Code Of
principles" is not the same as stating that everything in the financial statement is
perfect; rather, it means the financial statements are materially accurate and
provide sufficient disclosure to users of the financial statements.
Koch v. Koch Industries Inc., 969 F. Supp. 1460, 1558-59 (D. Kan. 1997) (citations
omitted).
273 Maureen Peyton King, The SEC'S (Changing?) Stance on JAS, 27 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 315, 317 (2001).
274 See generally Marshall S. Armstrong, The Work and Workings of the Financial
Accounting Standards Board, 29 Bus. LAW. 145 (1974) (describing FASB).
275 Id.
276 See Deborah A. Geier, The Myth of the Matching Principle as a Tax Value, 15
AM. J. TAX POL'Y 17, 27-40 (1998). A twenty-one person Accounting Principles Board
(APB) was created by the AICPA in 1959 to review significant accounting questions and
areas of inconsistency or where clarity was needed. Id. The AICPA also issues
"Statements of Position" on various accounting issues. See Trestman v. Microstrategy,
Inc., No. 01-0685 § "K" (1), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19668 (E.D. La. Nov. 15, 2001)
(describing one such statement).
277 Walter Wriston, The Solution to Scandals? Simpler Rules, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5,
2002, at A10.
278 Id. GAAPs have been compiled in a 4,500 page, three-volume set. Id. Some
rules are said to consume over 700 pages on how to book a single transaction. Id. FASB
has acted on some on controversial GAAP issues, and issued guidance, but not until after
years of study and lobbying by industry participants. See generally Edmund W. Kitch,
The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 763 (1995)
(describing and criticizing this statement). For example, treatment of goodwill after a
merger was an issue fought over for decades before the FASB finally issued FASB
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 141-Business Combinations (2001)
and FASB Statement No. 142-Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets (2001). Id.
Accounting for derivatives was addressed after a number of off-balance sheet
transactions resulted in large losses. Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging
Activities, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 [Original
Pronouncements, Accounting Standards as of June 1, 2002], Fin. Acct. Standards Board
(June 2000). Market-to-market accounting for trading activities was another prolonged
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Professional Ethics requires compliance with accounting
principles established by FASB. 279 The FASB has not acted in all
areas, resulting in varying GAAP standards and much uncertainty
and giving rise to calls for an "Accounting Court., 28 °
The SEC has deferred for the most part to the accounting
profession in developing GAAPs, but on occasion has set its own
accounting standards. 28 1 The SEC may impose particular standards
required for accounting statements in filings by issuers.282 This is
done by rule and "Accounting Series Releases" on matters the
SEC deems are not adequately addressed by the accounting
profession. 2" Regulation S-X, for example, imposes various
accounting requirements in public offerings, 284  and Staff
Accounting Bulletin 101 sought to define when companies could
record revenue on their books.285
Auditor Independence
On the auditing standards side, the AICPA created the Public
Oversight Board (POB) that maintained oversight of a peer review
program in which the accounting firms assessed the integrity of
each other's audit practices. 286 A problem encountered early on by
controversy on which the FASB eventually acted. FASB Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 107-Fair Value of Financial Instruments (1991). Disclosures
about Fair Value of Financial Instruments, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 107 [Original Pronouncements, Accounting Standards as of June 1, 2002] Fin. Acct.
Standards Board (Dec. 1991). Most controversial of all was the blocking of the FASB's
efforts to require the expensing of options granted to executives as compensation. See
LEVITT, supra note 114, at 10-11, 108-11 (describing controversy).
279 Geier, supra note 276, at 38.
280 Id.
281 See LEVITT, supra note 114, at 111-14. In recent years a dispute arose over
control of the FASB. Id. Industry groups wanted it controlled by more business friendly
individuals, while the SEC wanted it to have more public representation on its governing
body, the Financial Accounting Foundation. Id. A fifty-fifty split was agreed upon, but
the standard setting process remained mired in uncertainty. Id.
282 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01 (2002).
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 See Trestman v. Microstrategy, Inc., No. 01-0685 § "K" (1), 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19668 (E.D. La. Nov. 15, 2001) (describing this bulletin).
286 LEVITT, supra note 114, at 126. The POB disbanded in 2002 after it became clear
that an independent oversight body would be created. Id
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the SEC was that companies could simply fire auditors that
refused to certify its accounts because of perceived irregularities
or overly aggressive accounting methods that might mislead
investors.287 This impaired the independence of the auditor
because it would not want to lose the business.288 The SEC,
therefore, required companies to disclose to the public in a Form
8-K whenever auditors are changed.289 The SEC further assumed
the authority to discipline accountants that failed to meet what the
SEC deemed appropriate auditing standards.290
Congress also acted by adopting legislation on auditor
independence that sought to force accountants into the role of
policemen. Section 10A of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 set forth audit requirements on the part of
accountants certifying the statements of public corporations.291
They are required to comply with GAAP and GAAS standards.292
Moreover, this legislation required auditors to investigate any
possible illegal acts they encounter during the audit and to inform
management.293 If management does not act, and the matter is
material, the auditor must report the issue to the board of
directors. 294 The board must then inform the SEC or the auditor
must do so or resign the engagement.295 This legislation made the
accountant a professional informer, "rat," or whistleblower,
depending on your view, which may be unique in our society. This
287 See generally Mindy Jaffe Smolevitz, The Opinion Shopping Phenomenon:
Corporate America's Search for the Perfect Auditor, 52 BROOK. L. REv. 1077 (1987)
(describing SEC concerns with this abuse).
288 Id.
289 See generally id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (2002). As another spear pointing into
the back of issuers, the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act requires public companies to
maintain accurate books and records and to maintain a system of accounting controls that
will assure the company's accounts are prepared in accordance with GAAP. 15 U.S.C. §
78m(b)(2) (2000).
290 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(e) (2002).
291 Andrew W. Reiss, Powered by More Than GAAS. Section IJOA of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act Takes the Accounting Profession for a New Ride, 25
HOFSIRA L. REv. 1261 (1997) (describing this legislation).
292 See id
293 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2000).
294 Id.
295 Id.
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legislation also seems odd in having accountants determine what is
legal when they are not lawyers.
The industry responded to independence concerns by creating
the Independence Standards Board (ISB) to establish standards for
auditor independence, but it was too pacific for the SEC.296 The
SEC adopted its own auditor independence rules, but a subsequent
SEC investigation of PricewaterhouseCoopers uncovered an
astonishing 8,000 violations of the prohibition against ownership
of client stocks. 297 Thirty-one of the firm's top forty-three partners
owned stock in audit clients.298
Auditor independence was being challenged from another
direction. Accounting firms were losing interest in their audit
business with its attending litigation and reputational costs. They
began operating consulting operations for tax and other services,
which grew quickly and became competitors with the audit
services.299 Consulting services were creating conflicts of interest
when advice was given by the consulting arm for an audit client to
engage in aggressive accounting practices for tax, credit ratings, or
stock price reasons. This led to much criticism, but more
interesting was the acrimony in the accounting firms as their
consulting arms began to outpace the audit teams.3"' The
accounting firms were also becoming law firms. In 1999,
PricewaterhouseCoopers announced plans to become one of the
largest law firms in the country within five years.3 ' Ernst &
Young created a law firm in Washington, D.C. 302
These and other events raised alarm bells at the SEC, and the
SEC decided to revise its auditor independence rules.30 3 In doing
296 LEVITT, supra note 114, at 119-20.
297 11 MARKHAM, supra note 67, at 257; 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(b) (2002).
298 1I MARKHAM, supra note 67, at 257.
299 See LEVITT, supra note 114, at 8. The percentage of accounting firm revenues
from management consulting grew from one-third in 1993 to fifty one percent in 1999.
Id.
300 Markham, supra note 17, at 257.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements,
Exchange Act Release No. 42994, [2000 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
86,315, at 83, 527-30 (June 30, 2000).
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so, the SEC noted the changing nature of the accounting
industry.3 °4 It found that, far from being policeman, accounting
firms were becoming primarily business advisory service firms as
they increased revenues from non-audit services. 35 Accounting
firms were entering into business relationships such as strategic
alliances, co-marketing arrangements, and joint ventures with
audit clients and were offering ownership of parts of their
practices to others, including audit clients.30 6 The accounting firms
were merging with each other, resulting in increased firm size,
both domestically and internationally, and expanding into
international networks.30 7 Audit clients were also found to be
hiring an "increasing number of accounting firm partners,
professional staff, and their spouses for high level management
positions.""30
The SEC, thereafter, adopted rules to reflect these changes.
Among other things, those rules clarified the circumstances under
which an auditor would retain independence in light of
investments by auditors or their family members in audit clients,
employment relationships between auditors or their family
members and audit clients, and the scope of services provided by
audit firms to their audit clients. The rules identified certain non-
audit services that could impair the auditor's independence.3 9 The
SEC rules established four broad standards for measuring whether
activities would impair auditor independence. 1 0 Standards for
determining whether non-audit services would impair
independence were also specified.31
These rules were alarming because they promised what the
SEC could not deliver, viz., that auditor independence will assure
accurate accounting and full disclosure. The SEC stated its
position in ringing tones:
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 Id.
309 Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, No. 43,602
(Nov. 21, 2000).
310 Id.
311 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 9.6 (4th ed. 2002).
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Independent auditors have an important public trust. Every day,
millions of people invest their savings in our securities markets
in reliance on financial statements prepared by public companies
and audited by independent auditors. These auditors, using
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards ("GAAS"), examine
issuers' financial statements and issue opinions about whether
the financial statements, taken as a whole, are fairly presented in
conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
("GAAP"). While an auditor's opinion does not guarantee the
accuracy of financial statements, it furnishes investors with
critical assurance that the financial statements have been
subjected to a rigorous examination by an impartial and skilled
professional and that investors can therefore rely on them.
Providing that assurance to the public is the auditor's over-
arching duty.
Investors must be able to put their faith in issuers' financial
statements. If investors do not believe that the auditor is truly
independent from the issuer, they will derive little confidence
from the auditor's opinion and will be far less likely to invest in
the issuer's securities. Fostering investor confidence, therefore,
requires not only that auditors actually be independent of their
audit clients, but also that reasonable investors perceive them to
be independent.312
The collapse of Enron and several other large companies and a
wave of restated earnings would prove that this was a hollow
promise. Accountant certifications did not, and could not provide
this protection and confidence.
In the event, accounting firms began divesting themselves of
their consulting businesses. Andersen Consulting partners voted to
split themselves off from the less profitable Arthur Andersen audit
group and became Accenture.313 PricewaterhouseCoopers
312 Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) 86,315 at 83,528. The SEC further stated that:
One of our missions is to promote investor confidence in the reliability and
integrity of issuers' financial statements. To promote investor confidence, we
must ensure that our auditor independence requirements remain relevant,
effective, and fair in light of significant changes in the profession, structural
reorganizations of accounting firms, and demographic changes in society.
Id.
313 MARKHAM, supra note 17, at 257.
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separated its audit unit from its management consulting practice to
remove conflicts, spinning off its consulting operations to IBM.314
and Ernst & Young sold consulting operations for $4.8 billion.315
Deloitte & Touche initially decided to retain its consulting
business, 31 6 but later decided to sell, but then changed its mind
once again.3 17 Even so, the accounting firms' revenues in 2003
from consulting were still exceeding those from auditing.
The Full Disclosure System is Flawed
Enron and Other Accounting Failures
The SEC was observing a number of accounting problems as
the market bubble grew at the end of the 1990s. 31" The SEC
chairman was complaining vociferously of such things as "channel
stuffing" 319 and "cookie jar reserves" that were being used by
companies to manage their earnings.32 ° Pro forma earnings
314 William M. Bulkeley & Kemba Dunham, IBM Speeds Move to Consulting with
$3.5 Billion Acquisition, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2002, at Al.
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 Kemba J. Dunham, Consulting Unit of Deloitte Plans to Go Private, WALL ST.
J., June 7, 2002, at C5.
318 Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were even under attack for not disclosing their
accounting policies. The federal government later sought to force them to adopt
corporate disclosure practices used by other private companies. Patrick Barta, Freddie
Mac, Fannie Mae Face Disclosure Rules, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2002, at A2.
319 Channel stuffing involves sending unneeded goods to customers in order to
increase revenues. See SEC v. Dunlap, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,771 (S.D. Fla. Mar.
27, 2002) (describing channel stuffing scheme). Some less imaginative executives
simply listed expenses as assets and over stated accounts receivable. SEC Sanctions
FL1R Systems, Sues Former Officers for Inflating Earnings, 34 SEC. REG. & L. REP. No.
43, at 1806 (Nov. 4, 2002).
320 See LEVITT, supra note 117, at 163. Cookie jar reserves may be created by such
practices as creating inflated loss reserves that can be reduced in the future to increase
earnings. Id. The use of hidden reserves to manage earnings is actually an accepted
practice in many other countries. The SEC has for years been on a crusade against the
acceptance of international accounting standards that allow the use of such secret
reserves, which excluded many foreign companies from United States markets, impeding
cross-border capital flows. The SEC required foreign firms seeking access to American
markets to reconcile their financial statements with GAAP. More recently, the SEC has
been softening its opposition to international standards. The creation of an International
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 28
announcements that were not prepared in accordance with GAAP
were being used to manipulate actual results.32' Earnings
Accounting Standards Committee by some 100 accounting firms world wide, and its
governing board, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), that the SEC
was given a role in selecting, has been trying to lessen the SEC's concerns. Hal S. Scott
& Philip A. Wellons, International Finance, Transactions, Policy, and Regulation (9th
ed. 2002); see also James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1200 (1999) (describing issues arising under application of international
accounting standards); EDMUND COULSON, INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING,
C489 ALI-ABA 569 (Nov. 1989) (describing role of international accounting standards
committee); Charles Canfield, FASB v. IASC: Are the Structure and Standards Setting
Process at the IASC Adequate for the Securities and Exchange Commission to Accept
International Accounting Standards for Cross-Border Offerings?, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 125 (1999) (describing role of international accounting standards committee); see
generally Janice Grant Brunner, All Together Now? The Quest for International
Accounting Standards, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 911 (1999) (describing conflicts over
application of international standards); Scott B. Novak, A Step Toward Globalization:
The Move for International Accounting Standards, 9 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 203
(1998) (describing conflicts over application of international standards). The SEC issued
a concept release in 2000 that sought comment on the development of a set of broad
standards for determining whether an international accounting method met the SEC's
goals of full disclosure. SEC Concept Release: International Accounting Standards,
[1999-2000 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,237 at 82,969 (Feb. 16,
2000). The subsequent collapse of Enron Corp. and ensuing scandals has thrown that
project into an era of uncertainty, but work continues. See 1ASB and FASB Signal
Commitment to Cut Accounting Differences in Accounting Rules, 34 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
No. 34, at 1566 (Sept. 23, 2002) and SEC Members, EC Hail Accord Reached by U.S.,
International Rulemakers, 34 SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 43, at 1808 (Nov. 4, 2002)
(FASB and IASB continue to seek to reconcile differences between GAAP and
international standards). Enron also gave rise to debates over whether American
generally accepted accounting principles standards should be followed rather than the
principle based international accounting standards that allow more discretion than does
GAAP. The Impossible Dream, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 2002, at 69. The FASB has
published a proposal for principle-based accounting. FEDERAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
BOARD, PROPOSAL: PRINCIPLES-BASED APPROACH TO U.S. STANDARD SETTING (2002)
available at http:/./www.fasb.org/proposals/principles-basedapproach.pdf.
Compounding this picture, the European Union is requiring its companies to use IASB
standards by 2005, which will cause difficulties for European firms listing their stock in
the United States unless reconciliation is achieved. Institutional investors in America
would also like a single standard. Michael Skapinker, Investors Look for Single
Accounting Standard, FIN. TIMES, July 8, 2002, at 21.
321 See In the Matter of Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 45,287 (Jan. 16, 2002) (administrative sanctions imposed by consent for
misstating pro forma results), available at 2002 WL 58566. Pro forma results may
exclude certain events such as a one-time charge in order to allow investors to assess the
underlying business unaffected by an extraordinary event. The SEC was concerned that
bad events were excluded, while one time good events were left in the pro forma results.
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restatements were rare before 1995.322 Between 1998 and the first
half of 2002, however, there were over 650 accounting
restatements by public corporations.323 That number continued to
swell. For the entire year in 2002, there were 330 restatements, up
from 270 in 2001 .324 Accounting failures were said to have cost
investors $88 billion between 1993 and 2000.325
Something was definitely wrong with full disclosure. The
market collapse that began in 2000 exposed even more disturbing
flaws in the full disclosure network. At the center of this debacle
were failures in accounting. Enron and its auditor, Arthur
Anderson, came under scrutiny for failing adequately to disclose
the accounting practices of Enron that allowed the company to
keep large liabilities off its balance sheet, sometimes using special
purpose vehicles in which management had invested.3 26 Enron
Id. An analyst at Merrill Lynch announced that he would no longer rely on pro forma
announcements, unless they were prepared in accordance with GAAP. Merrill Analyst
Shifts His Accounting Focus in Making Forecasts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2002, at C8. The
SEC also adopted a rule requiring companies to state when their pro forma reports are
not in accordance with GAAP. Michael Schroeder, SEC Orders New Disclosures on
Company Earnings, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2003, at A2.
322 Fox, supra note 167, at 246. Only three companies restated earnings in 1981.
LEVITT, supra note 114, at 117.
323 Jonathan Clements, Damage Control: What You Need to Do Now, WALL ST. J.,
June 27, 2002, at D1.
324 Cassell Bryan-Low, Restatements Rise 22%, WALL ST. J., Jan.21, 2003, at C3.
325 Mike McNamee et al., Accounting Wars, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 25, 2000, at 156.
326 Enron's stock traded as high as $90 before dropping below $1 just before it
declared bankruptcy. Enron's demise was triggered by accounting issues over special
purpose entities (SPEs) called such things as "Raptors", Chewco", and "JEDI." They
were special purpose entities that operated as limited partnerships and were used to take
losses off of its books and to increase earnings. Accounting rules allowed an entity that
was only three percent owned by outside parties to be removed from the books of a
company owning ninety-seven percent. Chewco failed to meet this requirement, falling
short by about one percent or $3 million. See generally SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(Feb. 1, 2002) (describing accounting shortcuts taken by Enron), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/sicreport020102.pdf.; Leslie Wayne,
Chagrined Enron Partners Try to Stave off Both Losses and Scandal's Taint, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2002, at 20 (describing other off-the-books partnerships). Michael
Kopper, a financial executive at Enron, pleaded guilty to two felony counts of fraud in
connection with special purpose entities used by Enron, including Chewco. The Enron
and Tyco Cleanups, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2002, at A12. The FASB later increased the
independence requirement for SPE ownership, adding some additional control tests.
Jackie Spinner, Rules Mean Uncertainty for Enron-Style 'SPEs', WASH. POST, Jan. 24,
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announced a $1.01 billion charge resulting from limited
partnerships, including one operated by the firm's chief financial
officer.327 This resulted in a $618 million third-quarter loss for the
company in 2001 .328 Enron did not survive the resulting firestorm,
and it became the largest bankruptcy in American history,
although that record was soon bested by an even larger accounting
scandal and bankruptcy at WorldCom, Inc. At the time of its
bankruptcy, Enron was the seventh largest company in the United
2003, at E0I. Enron also used synthetic leases as substitutes for loans, allowing those
obligations to be kept off the balance sheet. Fox, supra note 162, at 120. Another device
used were so-called prepaid forward contracts that were later claimed to be simply
disguised loans made to Enron by J.P. Morgan-Chase. Jathon Sapsford, et al., Lenders'
Deals Aided Energy-Firm Results, June 26, 2002, at Cl. A settlement was reached
before this issue was submitted to a jury. Jurors Were Divided Over Morgan's Lawsuit,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2003, at C2. The Manhattan district attorney's office was also
investigating these transactions. Paul Beckett & Laurie P. Cohen, J.P. Morgan is Still
Shadowed by Enron Links, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2003, at C l. Loans were pushed off
balance sheets using other devices including the use of collateralized debt obligations.
Jonathan Weil & Henny Sender, Loose Audit Rules Keep Debt Defaults off Books for
Now, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2003, at C 1. Another financial instrument used by Enron was
something called monthly income preferred shares (MIPS). These instruments made
periodic payments to investors that were treated as interest payments for income tax
purposes but were used by rating agencies as equity in order to reduce the amount of
leverage on the company's balance sheet. It was thus both a stock and a loan at the same
time. John D. McKinnon & Greg Hitt, Double Play: How Treasury Lost a Battle to
Quash a Dubious Security, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2002, at A1. Enron had problems
beyond the accounting issues with its balance sheet manipulations. Enron was also
blamed for the California energy crisis, which arose as the result that state's failure to
expand its power generation sources and market supplies. Enron was in the forefront of a
war between market forces and government regulation. California claimed that Enron
and other energy traders were manipulating prices in energy contracts in order to profit at
the expense of California consumers. The market eventually forced a solution by
increasing prices and decreasing demand, as well as requiring more practical
management of energy supplies. Enron was engaging in such things as "ricochet" trades
"fat boy," "Get Shorty," and "Death Star." Julie Earle, The Round Trips to Nowhere, FIN.
TIMES, May 15, 2002, at 19. Other energy trading firms had been engaged in so-called
"round trip" transactions, buying and selling to themselves in order to boost their trading
volumes. Among the firms engaged in such activities were CMS Energy, Dynegy, and
Reliant Resources. Nancy Dunne & Julie Earle, Regulators 'Knew About Bogus Energy
Trades', FN. TIMES, May 16, 2002, at 10.
327 Nima Warfield, et al., One Year, Two Worlds: What Was News in 2001, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 2, 2002, at R12.
328 Id. Several indictments followed the Enron collapse. Fox, supra note 162, at
162.
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States.3 29 One newspaper claimed, however, that if Enron had
properly accounted for its operations, the firm would have ranked
only 287 in the list of the country's largest companies.330 Arthur
Anderson was also destroyed in the Enron scandal after being
convicted of obstruction of justice in connection with its handling
of Enron documents.33'
Accounting Implosions
The political outcry over Enron and other accounting problems
undermined confidence in the SEC's full disclosure system and
accounting in general. To restore that confidence, the SEC
required chief executive officers and chief financial officers of the
largest publicly traded companies to swear that their financial
statements were accurate. A total of sixteen of about 950
responding companies were unable to certify to the accuracy and
completeness of their companies' reports and filed explanations.
332
In the end, the SEC's loyalty oath requirement was only
cosmetics. The system was simply too broken to patch so easily.
Arthur Andersen's problems at Enron were not its only
transgressions in failing to fulfill its role as a quasi-governmental
policeman. The accounting firm had previously settled for $7
million in an SEC suit charging fraud in its audit of Waste
Management.33 3 Arthur Andersen and the company agreed to settle
329 Enron's Bankruptcy: Wasted Energy, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 2001, at 13.
330 SIEBERT, supra note 114, at 221.
331 See Jonathan Weil, et al., Anderson Win Lifts U.S. Enron Case, WALL ST. J.,
June 17, 2002, at Al. The government decided that 85,000 Andersen employees
worldwide should be put out of work for the wrongdoing of a few. Markham, supra note
220. In comparison, it appears that there were some 5,300 layoffs at Enron following the
bankruptcy of a total work force of about 25,000 in all the Enron entities. Fox, supra
note 162, at 288. Only sixty-eight of Enron's 3,500 companies initially filed for
bankruptcy. Id. at 287. Arthur Andersen was one of the "Big Five" accounting firms. It
was founded in 1914 by a twenty-eight year old Northwestern University accounting
professor. The firm grew over the years into a behemoth with worldwide operations and
158 campuses where it taught entering accountants. The accounting firm was generating
$9.3 billion in revenue when the scandal broke. Ken Brown & lanthe Jeanne Dugan, Sad
Account: Andersen's Fallfrom Grace is a Tale of Greed and Miscues, WALL ST. J., June
7, 2002 at Al.
332 See generally www.SEC.gov.
333 Waste Management itself announced in November 2001 that it was paying $457
million to settle a class action securities suit involving these problems. Warfield, supra
note 286, at R16. This raises the question of who is actually paying the damages. It
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shareholder lawsuits arising from the Waste Management problem
for $220 million in 1998. 3"' Arthur Andersen also paid $110
million as a settlement of a lawsuit involving Sunbeam in 2000.3"'
The firm was charged with having certified Sunbeam's accounting
statements despite the fact that a large amount of fake profits were
reported.336
These were not events isolated within Arthur Andersen. In
January 2002, the SEC reached a settlement with KPMG in which
the accounting firm was charged with improperly investing in a
mutual fund that was administered by an investment company the
accounting firm audited.337 The accounting firm invested $25
million in this mutual fund.338 KPMG was also censured by the
SEC.339 The SEC has also accused KPMG of failing to police the
accounting practices of Xerox that resulted in $6.4 billion in
restated earnings by that corporation. 340 Ernst & Young paid $335
million in 1999 to settle a suit brought by investors in CUC
International.3 4' Ernst & Young was also in trouble with the
regulators.3 42 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation filed a $2
billion suit against the accounting firm in connection with the
failure of the Superior Bank in a Chicago suburb.3 43 The FDIC
charged that the accounting firm failed to properly audit the books
and records of the bank, allowing that bank to engage in fraud in
seems that the shareholders are either paying themselves back or foisting the loss off
onto subsequent equally innocent shareholders.
334 Fox, supra note 167, at 182.
335 Id.
336 Id. The Andersen audit partner on the engagement was barred from practicing as
an accountant before the SEC for at least three years. Financial Fraud, Audit Partner,
Former Sunbeam Officials Settle SEC charges over Alleged Scheme, 35 Sec. REG. & L.
REP. No. 5, at 208 (Feb. 3, 2003).
337 Judith Bums & Jonathan Weil, SEC Censures KPMG Over Investment, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 15, 2002, at C17.
338 Id.
339 Id.
340 Adrian Michaels, KPMG Accused of Ignoring Xerox Alerts, FtN. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2003, at 21.
341 Adrian Michaels & Michael Peel, Andersen Faces Deloitte Touche Investigation,
FrN. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at 28.
342 See Ernst & Young Faces $2bn Suit, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 2-3, 2002, at 18.
343 Id.
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the sale of securitized assets, but that suit was later dismissed by a
federal court.344
Accounting scandals were endemic elsewhere. As noted,
Xerox confessed that it had accelerated revenue improperly from
1997 through 2001 in amounts totaling $6.4 billion.345 Reliant
Resources Inc. announced in July of 2002 that it was restating its
earnings for a three-year period as a result of an artificial inflation
of its revenues by more than $7.8 billion.346 That action was the
result of "round trip" trades in electricity that bought and sold at
the same quantity and price in order to pump up the firm's trading
volumes.3 47 Bristol-Myers Squibb, the pharmaceutical company,
announced in October of 2002 that it was restating over $2 billion
in inflated sales figures.3 48 The Rite Aid Corporation's restatement
was for $1.6 billion in various years in the late 1990s.3 49 Former
executives at Rite Aid were indicted for fraudulently inflating
profits of the company.35 ° Its chief executive officer, Martin Grass,
was facing charges of accounting fraud, false statements to the
government, and obstruction of justice by tampering with a
witness.351 An executive at Symbol Technologies pled guilty to
federal charges that he inflated earnings to meet Wall Street
expectations for that company.
The president of Critical Path Inc. pleaded guilty to charges
that he falsified company revenues for 2000.352 The stock value
subsequently dropped from $3.8 billion to $192 million.353 At the
344 Id.
345 Mark Maremont & James Bandler, Deeper Accounting Woes at Xerox, WALL ST.
J., June 28, 2002, at A3.
346 In SEC Filing, Reliant Restates Three Years of Inflated Earnings, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, July 6, 2002 at DI.
347 Id.
348 Seeing Red, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2002, at 22.
349 Gary Strauss, America's Corporate Meltdown, USA TODAY, June 27, 2002, at
IA.
350 Id.
351 Scott Kilman, Rite Aid Ex-Officials Charged in Accounting-Fraud Probe, WALL
ST. J., June 24, 2002, at A2.
352 Ex-Critical Path Official Pleads Guilty to Plot of Exaggerating Revenue, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 14, 2002, at B7.
353 Id. AOL was facing a $1 billion liability over claims that it inflated revenues.
What's News, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2003, at Al.
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same time, Take-Two announced that it was the subject of an SEC
investigation for certain of its accounting practices.354 Cendant
Corp. inflated $500 million in earnings on its records,
embarrassing its auditor-Ernst & Young.355 PNC Financial was
required to restate its earnings twice for 2001.356 The total
restatement reduced earnings by $377 million, a reduction of about
one third of the previously reported earnings.357Vivendi wrote down over $12 billion of assets in the form of
corporate goodwill,358 but that paled in comparison to the $54.2
billion written off by AOL Time Warner.3 59 Cisco Systems, Inc.
took a $2.8 billion write down on inventory. 360 An executive at
Tyco, who had been indicted for not paying state sales taxes on
expensive paintings, was also found to have looted as much as
$175 million from the corporation, using the funds for such things
as a $6,000 shower curtain and a $2.1 million birthday party for
his wife on the island of Sardinia where singer Jimmy Buffett was
imported for her entertainment. 361 Tyco, thereafter, announced a
$6 billion charge against earnings 362 that was said to be the result
of "a pattern of aggressive accounting" designed to inflate
earnings.363 Other executives had been similarly greedy. A survey
by the Financial Times concluded that in the three years prior to
August 2002 the top executives and directors involved in major
business collapses in the United States were paid about $3.3
354 Aaron Elstein & Cindy Perman, Take Two Announces SEC Investigation, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 14, 2002, at B8.
355 Il MARKHAM, supra note 132, at 343.
356 Gary Silverman, PNC to Restate Its Results Again, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2002.
357 Id.
358 John Carreyrou, Vivendi Posts Big Loss for 2001 After Write-Down of Goodwill,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2002, at B2. Tyco subsequently announced a further $1.1 billion
restatement in April 2003. What's News, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2003, at AI.
359 Business, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 2002, at 7. AOLTime Warner later
announced that it was also restating some $480 million in revenues for the years 2001
and 2002. Other News, FN. TIMES (London), Mar. 29-30, 2003, at 1.
360 LEVITT, supra note 114, at 164-65.
361 Mark Maremont & Laurie P. Cohen, How Tyco's CEO Enriched Himself, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 7, 2002, at Al.
362 Peter Larsen, Tyco May Take $6bn Hit in CIT Disposal, FIN. TIMES, June 6,
2002, at 25.
363 What's News, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2002, at Al.
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billion. At the same time these enormous sums were being paid
out, those companies also laid off some 100,000 workers and
hundreds of billions of shareholder value were lost.364 That report
led Eliot Spitzer, the New York State Attorney General, to
commence an investigation of those executives.365
The telecoms were at center of an ocean of red ink and
accounting fraud. Seventeen of those companies saw their stock
values drop a collective $1 trillion, "not to mention another
thousand related bankruptcies." '366 AT&T took a $1 billion
restructuring charge in the last quarter of 2001 and cut 10,000
jobs.367 Global Crossing, a fiber optic telecom carrier whose
valuation had reached $50 billion, filed for bankruptcy.368 It
became the fourth largest bankruptcy in United States history.369
Nortel Networks, a telecommunications firm, saw its chief
financial officer resign as a result of some improper personal
investments. Nortel's stock price had dropped almost ninety
percent in the prior two years. That was a loss of $140 billion in
market value.37° WorldCom, Inc. and Qwest Communications
International, one of the Baby Bells, announced write-offs of $60
billion in goodwill as a result in the change in accounting rules for
merger-acquired goodwill.371 Qwest was also defending itself in
the press against claims that it had improperly accounted for
364 len Cheng, $3.3bn for Executives of Failed Companies, FIN. TIMES, July 31,
2002, at 1.
365 Lionel Barber, et al., New York State Attorney General Probes Awards to Heads
of Bankrupt Groups, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2002, at 1; see Caroline Daniel, et al., Insiders
Who Managed to Get Out Just in Time, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2002.
366 George Gilder, Broadband's Narrow Minds, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2003, at AI4;
Holman W. Jenkins Jr., CEOs Who Can't Let Go of Their Stock, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12,
2003, at A17.
367 What's News, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2002, at Al.
368 Business, Survival of the Slowest, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 2002, at 9.
369 LEVITT, supra note 114, at 144.
370 Justin Bear, Nortel Issues Gloomy Report, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Feb. 13, 2002, at D1. One magazine noted that, if an investor had purchased $100,000 of
Nortel stock in July 2001, it would have been worth only $5,483.52 in December of
2001. In contrast, if the same investor had bought $100,000 of bottled beer, that
investment would be worth $10,006.50 in empty returnable bottles. MAXIM MAGAZINE,
Dec. 2001, at 46.
371 Thorold Barker & Peter Thal Larsen, U.S. Telecoms Groups May Have to Write
Off $6Obn in Goodwill, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2002, at 21.
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certain equipment sales to KMC Telecom Holdings, Inc.372 The
company restated $2.2 billion in revenue. Four of its executives
were indicted for inflating the company's revenues.373 Qwest was
among those engaging in dubious accounting practices designed to
bolster its financial results.374 That firm engaged in swaps in
phone connections with other companies which would constitute
revenue.375 The firm later had to restate those swaps.376 Lucent
Technologies, Inc. restated $679 million in revenue for a single
quarter. 37  Charter Communications, a cable company, over stated
its revenues by almost $300 million over a three-year period.
WorldCom announced that it had engaged in a staggering $9
billion in fraudulent accounting entries3 78 designed to boost its
stock performance.379 The company was delisted from Nasdaq,3 s°
and on July 21, 2002, WorldCom filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
WorldCom shoved Enron aside to take the dubious title of the
largest bankruptcy in history.3"' On October 1, 2002, Elliot
Spitzer, the New York Attorney General, brought charges against
five individuals including former WorldCom CEO Bernard
Ebbers, claiming that they had improperly profited by more than
$1.5 billion from shares given to them in IPOs as an inducement
for them to direct their company's business to investment banking
firms such as Salomon Smith Barney.382 As noted, this practice
372 Deborah Solomon, Qwest Defends Accounting Practices, Says It Disclosed KMC
Deal to Investors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2002, at B8.
373 Dennis Berman & Deborah Solomon, Ex-Executives Are Indicted in Qwest
Probe, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2003, at B1.
374 Dennis K. Berman, et al., Tricks of the Trade, As Market Bubble Neared End,
Bogus Swaps Provided a Lift, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2002, at Al.
375 Id.
376 Id.
377 Lucent was spared SEC sanctions because it caught the error before filing its
quarterly report with the SEC. Dennis Berman, SEC Ends 2-Year Lucent Probe With
Accord Carrying No Fines, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2003, at B7.
378 SEC: WorldCom Misstated Earnings by $9 Billion, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 6, 2002, at 1.
379 WorldCom Fraud Rises $3.3 Billion, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON., Aug. 9,
2002, at 12D.
380 Deborah Solomon, et al., WorldCom Angers Regulators as Accounting Scandal
Widens, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2002, Al.
381 What's News, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2002, at Al.
382 Charles Gasparino, New York Sues Telecom Executives Over Stock Profits,
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was similar to the use of "preferred" accounts used by J.P. Morgan
and others back in the 1920s, which were roundly criticized. In a
return to pre-SEC regulation, Spitzer used the Martin Act to
investigate and prosecute those executives.
Two senior executives at the Sprint Corp. were forced to
resign after it was revealed to their board of directors that they had
used a dubious tax shelter to avoid paying taxes on over $100
million of income from stock options they had been awarded as
bonuses. These executives used a tax shelter recommended by the
auditor for the Sprint Corp. Company policy required the
executives to use Sprint's auditor for the preparation of their tax
returns and allowed them to use the tax advice services of the
auditor.383 Adelphia, the cable company, announced that it had
overstated revenue and cash flow by some $500 million over a
two-year period.3 84 Adelphia was also a co-borrower of $3.1
billion in loans to a partnership owned by its founding family, the
Rigas The family used $1.4 billion of that loan to buy company
stock.386 Adelphia filed for bankruptcy on June 25, 2002. It was
then the nation's sixth largest cable company.387 The founder of
Adelphia, the giant cable television company, was arrested, along
with his two sons, for looting the company.388 Underscoring the
cynicism engendered by the federal securities laws, Adelphia
brought suit against its auditor Deloitte & Touche for failing to
stop the company's own executives from their alleged looting. 89
Attorney General Spitzer Seeks Return of l.5 Billion Citing Solomon Dealings, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 1, 2002, Al, at A10; see generally Smith & Pulliam, supra note 227 (describing
this practice); Susan Pulliam, et al., Easy Money, Former WorldCom CEO Built an
Empire on Mountain of Debt, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2002, at Al (describing some
abuses).
383 Rebecca Blumenstein & Carol Hymowitz, Troubling Options, Inside the Tough
Call at Sprint: Fire Auditor or Top Executives, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2003 at Al.
384 What's News, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2002, at Al; Deborah Solomon, Adelphia
Overstated Cash Flow, Revenue, Over Past Two Years, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2002, at
Al.
385 Solomon, supra note 372.
386 Deborah Solomon, Salomon Draws Focus by SEC Over Adelphia, WALL ST. J.,
June 5, 2002, at C1.
387 Deborah Solomon, Adelphia Communications Files for Bankruptcy-Court
Protection, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2002, at A3.
388 What's News, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2002, at Al.
389 Jonathan Weil, Deloitte's Work for Ahold Raises Audit Questions, WALL ST. J.,
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More problems followed for Deloitte & Touche after Ahold,
N.V., one of the largest grocery distribution chains in the world,
announced in 2003 that it was restating $500 million in revenue.
Ahold, a Dutch company with large operations in the United
States, listed its shares through ADRs on the New York Stock
Exchange.39° Deloitte & Touche discovered those discrepancies
but not until after auditing and certifying earlier statements that
were now being restated.391' This event triggered SEC
investigations into the accounting practices of other grocery
distributors, including Fleming Co., the worlds largest such
distributor that had previously been the subject of stories claiming
that it had engaged in sharp practices with suppliers in order to
boost revenues. Another food distributor, Nash Finch Co., was
also under investigation for its accounting practices.392
Lehman Brothers was under SEC investigation for its
accounting disclosures concerning its exposure to the Russian
securities market.393 Gateway, the computer maker, announced
that it was restating $500 million in revenues for the years 2001
and 2002. Provident Financial in Cincinnati announced that it was
restating its profits for a six year period, reducing its profits by
twelve percent during those periods.394 An executive at Symbol
Technologies pled guilty to criminal charges in connection with
the inflating of revenues at that company by more than ten percent
and totaling several hundred million dollars.395 HealthSouth Corp.,
Feb. 25, 2003, at A10.
390 Deborah Ball & Steve Stecklow, Supermarket Firm Ahold Faces U.S. Inquiries,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2003, at A2; Ahold was not the only foreign firm experiencing
losses. Deutsche Telekom had a loss of $27.1 billion in 2002, a German record. What's
News, WALL ST. J., March 11, 2003, at Al.
391 Id.
392 Ann Zimmerman & Patricia Callahan, Payments to Distributors Draw Scrutiny,
Fleming Now Faces a Formal Probe, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2003, at A2; Accounting
practices at other food service firms, including Sara Lee and ConAgra Foods, Inc., were
being investigated. Anita Raghavan & Deborah Ball, Ahold Investigation May Expand,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2003, at A3.
393 Nikki Tait, Lehman Accused Over Russian Exposure, FrN. TIMES Feb. 21, 2003,
at 15, available at LexisNewsGroup File (last visited Mar. 31, 2003).
394 Joseph T. Hallinan, Provident Financial to Restate Profits for 6 Years, Cuts
Outlook, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2003, at B2.
395 Kara Scannell, Ex-Official at Symbol Pleads Guilty, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2003,
at C7.
[Vol. 28
RETHINKING FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
an out patient health care business, was charged with falsifying
$1.4 billion in profits over a five-year period.396 Electronic Data
Systems Corp. and- Hewlett-Packard were suffering stock price
declines as a result of concerns with their accounting practices.397
Other firms were suffering from old-fashioned market failures.
Conseco became the third largest bankruptcy in history in 2002.398
Polaroid filed for bankruptcy in September of 2001.'99 Kmart filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on January 22, 2002, marking the
largest retail bankruptcy in history.4°° Kmart had almost $40
billion in annual sales before filing for bankruptcy. As concern
arose about Kmart's continued viability increased, its share prices
dropped dramatically, by seventy percent in a single week. 4 ' The
company later reported that its executives had engaged in various
malpractices to enrich themselves and to avoid paying the
company's bills as they came due.40 2 Executives were indicted by
the Justice Department and others were sued by the SEC for
accounting malpractices.4 3 There was also bad news for investors
interested in the airlines industry. US Airways declared
bankruptcy, and American Airlines announced that it was laying-
off 7,000 workers.40 4 United Airlines filed for bankruptcy in
December of 2002. This was the largest bankruptcy of an airline in
396 Deborah Solomon, et al., HealthSouth Faked $1.4 Billion Profits, The SEC
Alleges, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2003, at Al.
397 Gary McWilliams, EDS Ousts Brown, Names New CEO, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21,
2003, at A3; Richard Waters, Renewed Reporting Concerns Hit HP, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2003, at 17.
398 Business, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at 1; see Adrian Michaels, Conseco Files
for Bankruptcy Protection, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at 20.
399 Warfield, et al., supra note 327, at R12.
400 What's News, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2002, at Al.
401 Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Kmart Stock Plunges as Bankruptcy Threat Looms,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at 1., available at Lexis NewsGroup File, http:www.lexis.com
(last visit Mar. 31, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law
and Commercial Regulation).
402 Amy Merrick, Kmart Files Restructuring Plan After Conducting Internal Probe,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2003, at A3.
403 Amy Merrick, U.S. Indicts 2 Ex-Executives of Kmart Corp., WALL ST. J., Feb.
27, 2003, at A3.
404 Edward Wong, American Airlines to Cut Jobs, Planes and Flights, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 2002, at C1.
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history.4 °5
Losses were also mounting as further management failures
were exposed by the downturn in the economy. In 2001, there
were 257 bankruptcies of publicly owned companies. This was a
record high.40 6 Other large firms, though not bankrupt, were
staggering. Ford Motor Company announced a fourth quarter loss
of $5.07 billion for 2001. It also warned of further losses in
2002,407 and the company announced that it was writing off $4
billion, closing plants, and dropping 10,000 employees and
thousands of contractor jobs.40 8 Another $1.7 billon in off-balance
sheet exposures were also being transferred back to the balance
sheet as accounting standards tightened.4 9  Computer firms
announced the layoff of 31,000 employees on a single day.410
Corporate bond defaults reached a year-to-date record of $140
billion in September, 2002. There were fifty fallen angels in that
group, i.e., companies whose bond ratings dropped from
investment grade to junk bond status.4 '
The Aftermath
Politics Intervene
The Enron scandal became a political football as regulators
and politicians vied with each other for headlines in exposing
scandals and reacting with ever increasing volume in professed
405 Mary Chung & Lisa Fingeret-Roth, Analysts See Hopeful Signs Beyond the
Debris, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 14, 2002, at 2, available at Lexis NewsGroup File
http://www.lexis.com (last visit Mar. 31, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
406 Fox, supra note 167, at 288. The record level of bankruptcies carried over into
2003. Jenny Wiggins, Bankruptcies Forecast to Stay Near Record, FIN. TIMES Feb. 27,
2003, at 15.
407 What's News, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2002, at Al; see Norihiko Shirouzu, Ford
Reports Losses for Quarter Year, Warns About 2002, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2002, at A2.
408 What's News, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2002, at Al; see Norihiko Shirouzu, Ford
Overhaul Could Cost Up To 4 Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2002, at A3.
409 Jeremy Grant & Andrew Hill, Ford Admits It Faces $1.7bn Hit to Accounts, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2003, at 12.
410 ANDERS, supra note 175, at 122.
411 Aline van Duyn, Paper Debt Defaults Hit Record $140bn, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 30,
2002, at 25.
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outrage. The Enron scandal was fueled by hotly contested state
and national elections that witnessed politicians of both parties
trying to "out-Enron" their opponents in condemning corporate
executives involved in the burgeoning scandals.412 President
George W. Bush found it necessary to deliver a televised address
on Wall Street on the importance of corporate responsibility in
which he stated he sought to increase penalties for executives who
break the law.4"3
The New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, turned himself
into a national figure by assuming control over the regulation of
the securities industry. Other state regulators quickly jumped in,
returning regulation to the Blue Sky laws of yester years.414
412 Markham, supra note 220; Richard Schmitt & Jerry Markon, Wall Street
Enforcers Uphold Giuliani Model, Prosecutors Spin Novel Theories, Play to Court of
Public Opinion, In Pursuing Alleged Wrongdoings, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2002, at Cl.
413 Jane Cummings, et al., Securities Threat, Bush Crackdown on Business Fraud
Signals New Era, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2002 at At. President Bush was himself the
target of criticism for loans used to buy stock of Harken Energy Corp. and for selling
stock in that company at a profit two months before it announced a $23.2 million
quarterly loss. This occurred when Bush was a director and consultant to the Harken
Energy Corp. in the 1980s. President Bush, however, pointed out that the stock
recovered and was trading at twice the price he sold it at several months later. Lydia
Adetunji, White House Defends Low-Interest Loans to Bush, FIN. TIMES, July 12, 2002,
at 1. Indeed, anyone in public life who had served in a corporation at any time was
subject to attack. Vice President Dick Cheney was under criticism for his stewardship at
Halliburton Corporation, a Houston energy company. A lawsuit brought by Judicial
Watch, a private interest group, was seeking to prove that he conspired to defraud
investors by questionable accounting practices. Those practices had been implemented
with the assistance of Arthur Andersen resulting in inflated income and earnings. The
lawsuit claimed that Halliburton had booked income from construction project overruns
that were in dispute. Gerard Baker, A Washington Insider, FIN. TIMES, July 13-14, 2002,
at 7.
414 Russell Gold & Andrew Caffrey, United Crime Busters, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1,
2002, at B 1. Among the absurdities of these investigations was the allocation by state
regulators amongst themselves of particular firms to investigate. Utah got Goldman
Sachs and Massachusetts was assigned Credit Suisse First Boston. Craig, supra note 216;
Patrick McGeehan, States Talk Tough, Wall St. Sweats, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002, §3, at
1. We have gone retrograde in other ways. Before World War 1, accounting doctrine was
based on the precept of "anticipate no profits and provide for all possible losses." Cf
Space Controls, Inc. v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 144, 148 n.12 (5th Cir. 1963) (citing
rule). This principle of conservatism required assets to be carried on the balance sheet at
their historical cost rather than their market value. Transactions had to be accounted for
on a cash basis. These conservative principles came under criticism during the
inflationary period of the 1920s, but gained favor again during the deflation that occurred
during the Great Depression. Modem accounting, however, shifted its focus to the
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Although few Americans understood the accounting issues
involved, they were collectively outraged. Using some inscrutable
formula, the Brookings Institute estimated that the corporate
governance scandals had cost the United States economy $35
billion, which would be equal to a $10 per barrel rise in the price
of oil.415 Corporate governance became a cottage industry for news
reports and conferences.
The elaborate self-regulatory system, the whistleblower
requirements for accountants imposed by congress, and the SEC
mandated auditor rules having failed, the government began to
bludgeon the accounting firms into becoming policeman. The
destruction of Arthur Andersen & Co. was the first strike.4"6 The
SEC also announced that it will be naming firms and not just
individual audit partners in future disciplinary proceedings.4"7
Congress was also reacting, but the SEC's chairman, Harvey
Pitt, sought to cut off any hasty legislative action, "By proposing
income statement, which led to "accrual" accounting. WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A.
EISENBERGG, CORPORATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS 1318-19 (6th unabridged ed.
1988). Accrual accounting requires a corporation to recognize revenues when earned and
liabilities when incurred. This means that income must be recorded when a sale is made
(i.e., when the goods are transferred or services rendered) even if cash is not received
until later. See generally In re Clinger & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No.
393390 (S.E.C. 1997) ("The accrual method of accounting requires that revenue be
recognized when the earnings process is complete and an exchange has taken place, as
opposed to the 'cash' method of accounting, which allows for revenue recognition only
when a cash payment is actually received."). Now, accounting critics are asserting that
accrual accounting has fostered many of the accounting failures now of concern and that
we should turn to the cash flow statement as the key basis for measuring the company's
operations. This is simply a return to cash basis accounting used in the 1920s. The
author leaves for others to explain why we have different financial accounting and tax
accounting systems that are used dually by corporations. Louis Lowenstein, Financial
Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 1335, 1341-42 (1996). A corporation may thus have pro forma (non-GAAP
reports), accrual accounting statements under GAAP and a cash flow, a.k.a., cash basis
statement, as well as separate tax accounting. The need for so many suggests the
inaccuracy and weakness of all as a measure of management.
415 Allen Beattle, Corporate Scandals Will Cost US 35 Billion, FIN. TIMES, Sep. 5,
2002, at 1.
416 That prosecution was incredibly shortsighted, costing investors hundreds of
millions of dollars that could have been recovered from Andersen in settlements if the
accounting firm had not been destroyed by the government. See Markham, supra note
220 (describing the failure of judgment in bringing the Andersen prosecution).
417 SEC Enforcement, 34 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 2019 (Dec. 16, 2002).
2003] RETHINKING FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
that a new body should be created that would be dominated by
public members and would have the power to discipline
accountants and maintain quality control standards."4 8 That
proposal was considered too mild, and Chairman Pitt came under
attack for maintaining relations with the accounting industry that
he represented while in practice.419 The result was the enactment
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act demanded higher auditor
independence requirements4 20  and strengthened the audit
committees of public companies.4 2' The act also created a new
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) (or to
some, "Peekaboo")4 22 that was to maintain auditor oversight,
replacing the self-regulatory model for that function.423
418 Randall Smith & Michael Schroeder, Pitt's SEC Plan for Self-Regulation of
Accountants May Have Pitfalls, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2002, at C15.
419 James Jaffe, Pitt and Stalled Reform, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 5, 2003, Perspective at 1.
For a description of that representation, see LEVITT, supra note 114, at 119. Chairman
Pitt also came under fire for seeking higher pay for SEC employees and cabinet status.
Janet Kidd Stewart & Frank James, Silver Lining Found in Pitt, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 7, 2002,
Business at 1.
420 The SEC later adopted regulations under that Act that would cause an auditor to
review its own work. Michael Schroeder, SEC Clears Rules Limiting Auditors From
Offering Consulting Services, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2003, at C9.
421 Audit committees must be composed of independent directors experienced in
finance and accounting. Audit Committee Financial Experts, Ethics Codes Must be
Disclosed SEC Says, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 3, at 113 (Jan. 20, 2003). This seems
strange because independent board members are not able to devote full time to audit
work. This makes them vulnerable to management manipulation. If the independent
directors do make it a full time job, then they have lost their independence.
422 Judith Bums, Deals and Deal Makers: Accounting Board Tackles Its Mission,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2003, at C5.
423 Scot J. Paltrow & Jonathan Weil, Accounting Industry Review Board Votes to
End Its Existence in Protest, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2002, at A2. The new accounting
authority immediately ran into trouble when Harvey Pitt selected William Webster to be
the head of that body. Webster, a former federal judge and FBI and CIA chairman, was
found to have been accused of acting fraudulently in his role as a member of an audit
committee for a public company. Both Pitt and Webster were forced to resign. Holman
W. Jenkins, Jr., The Harvey Thrill Ride, Cont'd., WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2002, at A23. It
seemed that anyone even remotely connected with business was now the target of one
full disclosure lapse or another.
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PCAOB and FASB Too
PCAOB is a strange creature. It in some ways compares to a
bank regulator.124 Accounting firms must register with it and be
inspected by it to assure compliance with audit standards. Those
firms not in compliance may be sanctioned by PCAOB 425 Audit
firms are restricted in their non-audit activities in a manner similar
to those already included in SEC rules, and PCAOB, not the
industry, will set GAAS.426 This program seemed to be designed
to make the accounting firms as unprofitable as possible by
increasing expenses and restricting revenues, therefore, effectively
turning accounting into something akin to a government agency,
but without immunity or the deep pockets of the taxpayers.
Who would want to be an accountant? The answer it seems is a
declining number. Between 1993 and 1999, the number of persons
taking CPA exams declined by nearly thirty percent and the
percentage of students majoring in accounting was cut in half in
the 1990s. 42 7 Clearly, this is an industry in trouble. But why would
a risk adverse accountant, which is the government's perception of
what an accountant should be, enter this profession? Their
character, fortune, and freedom are all at risk whenever a company
fails or its management misbehaves.
The FASB will apparently continue its role of setting
accounting principles in the form of GAAP. It will have some
meaty issues to contend with in this new environment. One
certainly controversial matter is the expensing of options. 28 That
424 See David Rogers, Big Salaries for Oversight Panel are Questioned on Capitol
Hill, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2003, at A4. One difference between PCAOB and other
regulators were the enormous salaries being paid to its members. The PCAOB chairman
was to receive $560,000 per year. Id. Not up to Enron standards, but not bad.
425 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
426 Id.
427 LEVITT, supra note 114, at 130.
428 Floyd Norris, Promises of a Nimbler Accounting Board, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,
2002, at C5; see also Wick Simmons, The Best Option, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2003, at
AI0 (asserting that expensing of options will impair American commerce). But see Janet
Whitman, Stock Options Are Fading Away as a Hot Issue, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2003, at
B 15 (the controversy over expensing options is fading); Ben White, Stock Options
Becoming Pay-Plan Dinosaurs?, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2003, at El (companies are using
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issue demonstrates how good intentions and ill-considered
legislation can easily run amuck. Options as executive
compensation became popular for many reasons. Congress
decided that tax penalties should be imposed on salary payments
in excess of $1 million.4 29 This made options attractive to high
roller executives because there was no cap, and options can have
tax advantages. 43  Options were also attractive to start-up
companies and their employees as a way of attracting motivated
employees who would be well compensated in a market bubble
such as that of the 1990s.43 Some eighty percent of executive
compensation was paid in stock options as the new century
began.432
The use of options also satisfied a demand by corporate critics
that executives be made more accountable to shareholders tying
compensation to the share price. In fact, the opposite occurred.433
Shareholders, at least most small investors, have a long-range
investment goal. They buy and hold. In contrast, a senior
executive seeks to receive as much cash as possible in as short as
time as possible for retirement and to gratify a lifestyle they
demand from their business success.43 4 These executives have a
alternative incentive programs).
429 Omnibus Revenue Reconciliation Bill of 1993, H.R. 2264, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993). This legislation prohibits a corporation from deducting more than $1 million for
an executive's salary without, among other things, obtaining shareholder approval. This
is a vote that a highly paid executive would not want to occur. See generally AMEY
STONE & MIKE BREWSTER, KING OF CAPITAL, SANDY WEILL AND THE MAKING OF
CITIGROUP, 246 (2002) (describing the salary cap).
430 See Janice Revell, Mo'Money, Fewer Problems, FORTUNE, Mar. 31, 2003, at 34
(describing how the $1 million limitation on deductions of executive salary encouraged
use of options that were not so limited).
431 LEVITT, supra note 114, at 212.
432 Id. at 111.
433 See generally Remarks of SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt at the Inaugural Lecture of
the JD/MBA Lecture Series at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management and
Northwestern Law School, Chicago, Ill., Apr. 4, 2002 (discussing concerns with the use
of options as executive compensation).
434 As an example of the incredible size of option payouts, Michael Eisner at Walt
Disney Co. exercised options in 2000 worth some $60 million and was holding
additional options valued at $266 million. HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 271, at 315-
316. Larry Ellison, the head of Oracle Corp., made $706 million on his options. Michael
Dell of Dell Computer made $233 million, Sanford Weill at Citigroup made $220
million, and Thomas Siebel of Siebel Systems made $174 million from option grants.
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tremendous incentive to boost their stock on a short-term basis so
that they can realize cash from their options. In order to
accomplish that goal, earnings must continually increase, giving
rise to imaginative schemes to manage or manipulate accounts.
Another downside in using options as a compensation incentive is
that their exercise dilutes the holdings of the long-term investors, a
matter that a liquidating executive will care little about.
435
The FASB, in the early 1990s, proposed to require
corporations to treat option grants as an expense on the income
statement and as a charge against earnings. 436 This met widespread
opposition, not only from overpaid executives, but also employees
and participants in the numerous startup companies that were
seeking to exploit the Internet.437 After this became a controversial
political football in Congress, the FASB backed off the
proposal.438
The issue was raised anew with the Enron debacle, although it
is not clear how option grants caused that company's demise.439
Matt Murray, Options Frenzy: What Went Wrong?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2002, at BI.
435 Some executives have been able to "double dip" from options on tracking stock.
Two Sprint executives made a total of $137 million on Sprint Wireless tracking stock,
while an executive at Perkin-Elmer made $62 million. John A. Byrne, Extra Helpings on
the Gravy Train, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 22, 2002, at 39.
436 LEVITT, supra note 114, at 107-108.
437 Id. at 110-11.
438 Id. at 109-10.
439 Enron executives made $1.4 billion from their options in 2000, which were then
largely sheltered by some now dubious tax gimmicks. Deborah Solomon, Enron Cut Tax
Bill by $2 billion in Working Around IRS Rules, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 14, 2003, at A3. This
was not, however, a cash drain on the company, and it is not clear how expensing
options would have changed the situation, other than perhaps assisting a decline in the
stock price. Among the concerns that arose from the Enron bankruptcy were the large
losses of its employees who had concentrated large amounts of Enron stock in their self-
directed 401(k) pension plans, while executives were profiting by millions of dollars in
stock sales obtained by option grants. See Altman, supra note 231 (describing some of
these sales). See generally Floyd Norris, The Markets: Stocks & Bonds After Two Year
Drop In Markets, Calendar Turns on Note of Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2002, at Al
(Enron stock values dropped more than $61 billion). The company retirement plan for
Enron employees limited the amount of purchases of its own stock. Pensions in America,
The Miracle of Diversity, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 15, 2001, at 10. The employees were not
so prudent. They held about fifty-four percent of their investments in their Section
401(k) accounts in Enron stock. The value of that stock dropped from $83 per share in
2000 to less than one dollar just before the company declared bankruptcy. Employees
had also been investing additional Enron stock through an employee stock purchase
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After, the collapse of Enron, several companies, including General
Electric and Coca-Cola, announced that they would expense
option in their 'future financial reports.44 ° The International
Accounting Standards Board also proposed that companies deduct
the costs of stock options from profits, but opposition remains.441
The accounting firms remain divided on the issue.442 FASB is now
in the process of deciding how to expense options.443
Resolving that issue will call into question its role in the post-
Enron era. Is it to be a social engineer, decreeing ways to curb
executive compensation, or is it an accounting body that will
program. One individual at Enron had his investments drop from $1.3 million to $8,200
in value before the company declared bankruptcy. Losses were compounded because the
401(k) plans were frozen due to a plan administrator turnover during the crash of the
Enron stock and employees could not sell before it was too late. Executives selling
option stock were not so constricted, but the Sarbanes-Oxley Act subsequently imposed
such a restriction. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 §
306(a)(2). The losses at Enron led to calls to restrict the percentage of holdings of such
employees to less than twenty-five percent of their total investment. This proposal
overlooked, however, the fact that employees had bought stock ownership in their
company in order to share in the growth. There were also many millionaires who had
been created by such stocks as Wal-Mart and Microsoft. By 1997, Microsoft alone had
produced 21,000 millionaire employees as the result of the rise in its stock value. This
was two-thirds of the company's employees. HAYNES JOHNSON, THE BEST OF TIMES,
AMERICA IN THE CLINTON YEARS 50 (2001). Microsoft stock, however, dropped from
$120 per share to below $40 at the end of 2000. Id. at 72. A survey found that other
large companies had large concentrations of company stock in employee 401(k) plans.
These included Abbott Laboratories (82 percent); Anheuser-Busch (83 percent),
McDonalds (74.3 percent) and Procter & Gamble (91.5 percent). Ellen E. Schultz &
Theo Francis, Companies'Hot Tax Break: 401(k)s, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2002, at Cl.
440 Alfred Rappaport, Manager's Journal: Choosing Useful Options, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 1, 2002, at B2. Only some twenty-one percent of companies whose profits would
be reduced by less than one percent have agreed to expense options. Few companies
have chosen to do so where the result would have a much larger effect on earnings. Janet
Whitman, Stock Options are Fading Away as a Hot Issue, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2003, at
B15.
441 Andrew Parker, et al., Foreign Regulators Grids for Tougher Rules, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2002, at 21.
442 Cassell Bryan-Low, Stock Options are Divisive Subject in Accounting, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 18, 2003, at C9.
443 Placing a value on the option will be another issue, some suggest using the
Black-Scholes economic model. LEVITT, supra note 114, at 108. For criticism of such an
approach, see Robert Bartley, Thinking Things Over: The Options-Accounting Sideshow,
WALL ST. J., July 29, 2002, at A15. In Seinfeld v. Bartz, 322 F.3d 693 (9th Cir. 2003),
the court dismissed claims that a proxy statement was misleading because it did not
disclose the value of options granted to executives under the Black-Scholes model.
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provide guidance on how companies account for their business in
a way that is clear, fair, and accurate? The latter role may be used
to justify the first, but that might be just another accounting trick
designed to accomplish an ulterior goal.
The Accountant as Policeman Revisited
The Role of the Accountant
The full disclosure model for the federal securities laws hinges
on the accountant's opinion. That has proved to be a fallacy in
assuring that investors are informed of the actual condition of their
company. Accountants have proved time after time that they are
not effective policeman. The savings and loan crisis of the 1980s
was blamed on the lapses of accountants who failed to detect the
many fraudulent and outrageous practices of numerous savings &
loan organizations that were captured by gangs of criminals.444
Three accounting firms made combined settlements in that fiasco
that totaled some $900 million.445 Even before the current
debacles, accounting firms were spending some nineteen percent
of their revenues on litigation costs.
446
Accountants became a deep pocket for investor claims when
public companies became bankrupt. That liability was to some
extent limited by a Supreme Court decision holding there was no
private right of action for books and records violations. 447 The
scienter requirement imposed by the Supreme Court on actions
under Rule lOb-5 added another cushion for accountants. 448 Still
another Supreme Court decision rejected aiding and abetting
liability that had been the basis for seeking damages from
444 For a description of the savings and loan debacle, which might more fairly be
blamed on regulators, see III MARKHAM, supra note 132, at 166-74; see generally
MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST BANK ROBBERY: THE COLLAPSE OF THE SAVINGS AND
LOAN INDUSTRY (1990) (describing abuses).
445 Anthony Muio, An Independent Auditor's Suit for Wrongful Discharge, 58 ALB.
L. REV 413 (1994).
446 Id.
447 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 574-78 (1979). Liability for
filing false documents could still be based on Section 18(a) of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a),
but that provision allows a good faith defense, and Section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933 also somewhat circumscribes accountant liability. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000).
448 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 204-05 (1976).
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accountants and lawyers in failing company cases. 449 Further aid
was given to the accountants under RICO by the Supreme
Court.45 ° The states have divided on whether to impose liability for
auditor negligence. Those rejecting such liability focus on the
inability of the auditor to assure accuracy of financial
statements.4 5 1
With this uncertain background, it seems strange that congress
and the SEC would continue to place the burden of assuring
disclosure on accountants.452 The accountant, who is at the heart of
449 Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 184 (1994).
450 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 182-84 (1993).
451 See generally Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1931)
(rejecting negligence liability); Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Sup. Cal.
1992) (rejecting negligence liability but describing approach of courts imposing such
liability). Courts in the United Kingdom had held that the auditor owed no duty to
subsequent shareholders and that auditors could disclaim responsibility in their opinions.
The SEC staff is trying to block the use of such disclaimers in the United States.
Jonathan Weil & Silvia Ascarelli, SEC Likely to Reject limit on Liability, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 28, 2003, at C7.
452 Blame is also being placed on other "gatekeepers" who must also be dragooned
into becoming informants in order to make full disclosure work. John C. Coffee, Jr., It's
About the Gatekeepers, Stupid, 57 Bus. L. 1403 (2002). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
now seeks to require lawyers to become policeman by requiring lawyers to report to the
board of directors where executives may be engaged in violations of the federal
securities laws. Thomas Lee Hazen, Administrative Law Controls on Attorney Practice-
A Look at the Securities and Exchange Commission's Lawyer Conduct Rules, - ADMIN.
L. REV. - (forthcoming 2003). Prosecutors are now demanding that corporations waive
attorney client privilege in order to avoid prosecution where employees have committed
violations. It seems that we must become a nation of informers in order to make full
disclosure work. Along those lines, two corporate whistleblowers, one at Enron and
another at WorldCom, were named "Persons-of-the-Year" by Time magazine. Persons of
the Year, TIME MAGAZINE, Dec. 30, 2002, at 58. The SEC was directed by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 to study the rating agencies (more formally referred to as Nationally
Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations (NRSROs)) and to determine if they too
should be deputized "gatekeepers." For criticism of the role palyed by the NSROs, see
Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, in RICHARD M. LEVICH, ET AL., EDS.,
RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM Ch.3 (2002). The SEC
subsequently sent congress a report on the NRSROs and is issuing a concept release
seeking comment on whether those entities should be subject to some form of regulation.
This is their punishment for not having predicted the demise of Enron. Congress and the
regulators have also ordained analysts with the robe of "gatekeepers" that imposes some
quasi-official full disclosure duties. Markham, supra note 220. SEC Regulation AC now
requires analysts to certify that they believe their reports are accurate and express the
analysts' true opinions. Compensation sources must be disclosed and other restrictions
are imposed. In addition, the SEC issued a concept release to require mutual funds to
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the full disclosure concept, is supposed to assure that the actual
results of public companies operations are accurately reported and
portrayed.453 In the eyes of the SEC and the public investor, the
accountant is viewed to be the cop on the beat.454 In reality, the
accountant provides no such service. The accountant simply
certifies that the corporation's financial statements were prepared
in accordance with GAAP. That certification is based on the
accountant's review of the company's records and some
verification of their accuracy through sampling, confirmation, or
observation.' This provides only minimal assurance that the
study whether another layer of regulation is needed for mutual funds. Deborah Solomon
& Karen Damato, SEC Moves on Mutual-Fund Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2003, at D9.
Firms with trading operations often tape recorded traders' conversations in order to
verify their orders in the event of a dispute. Trading room banter in those tapes is now
being used as evidence of guilt and posted on government websites. In one famous
example of a tape-recorded conversation, a trader stated that he wanted to "lure people
into the calm and then just totally fuck em." 11 MARKHAM, supra note 67, at 204. After
the analysts' scandals, emails everywhere were being scrutinized and brokerage firms are
being required by regulators to keep those emails. Lawyers are now telling clients and
even their own associates (since lawyers now are also under federal regulation) that it is
dangerous to communicate by this medium and that the telephone should be used lest
their comments be viewed in retrospect as evidence of wrongdoing. This all sounds like
some kind of totalitarian society, not a free market. Where does it end? Will children
also be required to inform on their executive parents in order to better assure full
disclosure? "Kids: If you see your mom and dad spending a lot of money and smiling a
lot, please call the SEC immediately at their 1-800 hotline." Will executives be required
to have cameras in their offices and listening devices piped into the SEC, all in the name
of full disclosure? Will business be required to be conducted in dark alleys in order to
avoid government surveillance?
453 Accounting has a venerable history. An accountant accompanied Columbus on
his voyage to America. I MARKHAM, supra note 51, at 8. Luca Pacioli, a Franciscan
monk, described double entry bookkeeping methods in 1494, calling it "the method of
Venice." Id. at 15. The practice of auditing corporate books was brought to America
from England and Scotland in the nineteenth century when "chartered" accountants from
those countries visited the United States to examine the investments of their clients. Four
of what later became the "Big Eight" accounting firms (a number that has since been cut
back to four, the "Final Four") were founded by chartered accountants from those
countries. Id. at 333-34.
454 This is illustrated by a recent action brought by the SEC against KPMG. The
SEC accuses that accounting firm of only "meekly" challenging the accounting practices
of Xerox that resulted in $6.4 billion in restatements by that corporation. Michaels, supra
note 340, at 15. What the SEC fails to realize is that accountants are meek by nature.
They are not trained to be adversaries to their clients or investigators.
455 The audit process has been described as follows:
In a typical audit, a CPA firm may verify the existence of tangible assets,
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records are actually accurate or that all information needed by the
investor has been disclosed or that it is even understandable. As
one court perceptively stated:
An auditor is a watchdog, not a bloodhound .... As a matter of
commercial reality, audits are performed in a client-controlled
environment. The client typically prepares its own financial
statements; it has direct control over and assumes primary
responsibility for their contents . . . .The fundamental and
primary responsibility for the accuracy [of financial statements]
rests upon management. The client engages the auditor, pays for
the audit, and communicates with audit personnel throughout the
engagement. Because the auditor cannot in the time available
become an expert in the client's business and record-keeping
systems, the client necessarily furnishes the information base for
the audit.
45 6
Management, not accountants, is responsible for disclosure,
and management is growing less, not more, interested in
observe business activities, and confirm account balances and mathematical
computations. It might also examine sample transactions or records to ascertain
the accuracy of the client company's financial and accounting systems. For
example, auditors often select transactions recorded in the company's books to
determine whether the recorded entries are supported by underlying data
(vouching). Or, approaching the problem from the opposite perspective, an
auditor might choose particular items of data to trace through the client's
accounting and bookkeeping process to determine whether the data have been
properly recorded and accounted for (tracing).
For practical reasons of time and cost, an audit rarely, if ever, examines every
accounting transaction in the records of a business. The planning and execution
of an audit therefore require a high degree of professional skill and judgment.
Initially, the CPA firm plans the audit by surveying the client's business
operations and accounting systems and making preliminary decisions as to the
scope of the audit and what methods and procedures will be used. The firm
then evaluates the internal financial control systems of the client and performs
compliance tests to determine whether they are functioning properly.
Transactions and data are sampled, vouched for, and traced. Throughout the
audit process, results are examined and procedures are reevaluated and modified
to reflect discoveries made by the auditors. "For example, if the auditor
discovers weaknesses in the internal control system of the client, the auditor
must plan additional audit procedures which will satisfy himself that the internal
control weaknesses have not caused any material misrepresentations in the
financial statements.
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 749-50 (Sup. Cal. 1992) (citations omitted).
456 Id. at 762.
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458disclosing bad news.457 The process is flawed in other respects.
As one senior government official has noted, accounting provides
backward looking information, particularly trailing quarterly
earnings. "It is driven by accounting standards that are a function
of habit and history, of often archaic and abstract principle, and of
a shortsighted conviction that it is better to obscure rather than
illuminate the real source of earnings., 459
In any event, the accountant is not an investigator. An
accountant does not have subpoena power, nor does an accountant
understand how to conduct an investigation. Accountants do not
have the time to investigate every annual report of clients. SEC
accounting investigations of a limited reporting period take years,
while the auditor has only a few months to review those same
figures. Unlike the SEC or the Justice Department, accountants
cannot compel testimony or offer plea bargains to uncover
wrongdoing. Rather, accountants are limited to a few cursory tests
for verifying data.
Perhaps the largest flaw in the disclosure model is that
accounting statements are management tools, not investigative
reports. Accounting reports were developed in order to allow
management to make more informed decisions and to better
manage the business by taking a periodic accounting of assets,
revenue and expenses. They may also provide creditors with some
limited third party verification on the finances of the company, a
very narrow function. In the best of circumstances, this function
does not assure management integrity and certainly is not a
457 Silvia Ascarelli, Companies Show Little Inclination to Disclose More, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 5, 2003, at C5.
458 The consolidation of accounting firms into the big four (the "final four") created
an oligopoly, or perhaps an oligarchy given their role, for administering the SEC audit
business, which may not be a very healthy economic model for such work.
459 See Treasury Official Sees Need for Relevant Disclosure, Supports SEC
Proposals, FED. SEC. L. REP. No. 2054 (2002) (describing speech of Treasury
Undersecretary for Domestic Finance Peter Fisher before the Securities Industry
Association). Forward looking reports were also criticized because management has a
tendency to exaggerate and because they focused investors on short term results. Coca
Cola announced that it would no longer make quarterly profit forecasts. Betty Liu &
Andrew Hill, Coca-Cola Attacks Wall ST Focus on Short-Term Outlook, FiN. TIMES
(London), Dec. 14-15, 2002, at 1. Like Regulation FD, see supra note 114, this is
another blow to an informed market. Soon, all that will be left are SEC mandated
disclosures that will allow management to ignore the future and concentrate on the past.
[Vol. 28
RETHINKING FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
promise of investor wealth or an insurance policy against
management failures or market down turns. Moreover, the
accountants are employed by the company they audit and are
dependent on its good will for continued business.46 ° The
accountant's client is management, not shareholders, and no
amount of legislation can change that stark fact. Arthur Andersen,
for example, had earned $52 million in fees from Enron in the year
prior to its demise.461 There is also a strong inclination to trust
your client and to aid the client whenever possible. This
relationship is not an adversarial one, such as those the SEC or
other government agencies investigate.462
PCAOB is supposed to fix the system and force accountants to
be policeman in their audits. Does anyone seriously believe that
this board will be able to monitor the auditing of thousands of
public companies to assure that accountants are acting as
policemen, rather than accountants? Of course it cannot, but
investors are still being deceived into believing that it will. The
Enron debacle and the telecom and dotcom implosions, as well as
continuing scandals, by now should have removed any doubts as
to the hollowness of the assurance that full disclosure protects
investors. That was an impossible dream, and Sarbanes-Oxley
only adds more smoke to this vision.463
460 In contrast, government policeman are not paid by those they investigate. Their
jobs are assured whatever they do. Government police also enjoy considerable immunity
from damages in both making improper charges and in failing to bring cases. Can you
imagine a lawsuit against the SEC for failing to detect the Enron financial problems
before its collapse? Yet, the SEC had all the power of the government to uncover the
accounting practices of Enron, including its financial statements and the authority to
decree that Enron report whatever information desired by the SEC at any time or place.
461 Michaels & Peel, supra note 341, at 18.
462 The destruction of Arthur Andersen has reduced competition and provided
leverage for the accounting firms to increase their fees, a cost that will only be passed on
to shareholders. Andrew Parker, PWC Warns Clients on Audit Fees, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
12,.2002, at 1.
463 Proposals for strengthening the policeman role of accounting included a
requirement for rotating clients after a specified period of time and preventing audit
partners from being hired by client firms. Cassell Bryan-Low, Panel Backs Stiff Audit
Measures: Consulting Limits, Firm Rotation, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2003, at C11. The
SEC eventually required only rotation of audit partners on audit engagements. Auditor
Independence, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 4 (BNA), at 160 (Jan. 27, 2003). This change
should assure that there is no institutional memory on the audit team and place the
accounting firm at a further disadvantage should management want to cook its books.
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Adopting a New Model
Information as a Commodity
The New Deal regulatory structure that was supposed to
provide investor protection does not work, and patching its skin or
adding even more layers of regulation will not make it structurally
sound.464 The states have now become the default regulators as the
full disclosure model crumbles. Eliot Spitzer and the attorney
general "wolf packs" have assumed control of market regulation
and left the SEC sputtering. 465 At best, the federal securities laws
History teaches us that post-bubble legislation and regulatory actions cause about as
much trouble as the bubble itself. John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge, Stupid
White Men, or the True Revolutionaries of Our Age, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 22-23, 2003, at I.
The South Sea Bubble in 1720 was pricked by legislation that sought to prevent the
formation of speculative enterprises. Id.; I MARKHAM, supra note 51, at 98-100. That
legislation was, thereafter, imposed on the colonies in America, preventing the
development of corporate business there until after the Revolution. THOMAS LEE HAZEN
& JERRY W. MARKHAM, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, CASES
AND MATERIALS 4 (2003). The South Sea Bubble continued to plague America. Andrew
Jackson somehow connected it to the Bank of the United States, which he then
destroyed. JASON GOODWIN, GREENBACK, THE ALMIGHTY DOLLAR AND THE INVENTION
OF AMERICA 172 (2003). That institution had stabilized American finance until Jackson
began his attack. The destruction of the Bank and other wrong headed actions by
Jackson was followed by the Panic of 1837. I MARKHAM, supra note 51, at 141-49.
464 The New Deal failed as a model in other respects. Unemployment remained at
14.6 % in 1940 as a result of its attacks on business. MELTZER, supra note 128, at 560.
465 See supra notes 412-423 and accompanying text. This event does not appear to
be a transient phenomenon. Spitzer was expanding his actions against the stock analysts.
Charles Gasparino, Spitzer Assigns Top Prosecutor To Probe of CFSB's Quattrone,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2003, at C4. He announced in January, 2003, that he would be
examining the short selling practices of hedge funds. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Short
Sellers are People Too! WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2003, at A19. He began an investigation of
the credit derivatives market. Henry Sender, Hedge-Fund Inquiry by Spitzer is Turning
to Credit Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2003, at C7. Spitzer was also attacking
lawyers for failing to detect abuses. John Caher, At State Bar Summit, Spitzer Blasts
Lawyers on Corporate Scandals, N.Y. L. J. Jan. 23, 2003, at 1. He announced plans to
seek expanded legislative authority to further his control over the securities markets.
New YorkAG Calls for Corporate Accountability Reforms, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 4
(BNA), at 125 (Jan. 27, 2003). Spitzer was even dictating to the New York Stock
Exchange on who was qualified to serve on its board of directors. Charles Gasparino &
Randall Smith, Behind Weill's Almost Directorship at NYSE, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25,
2003, at Cl (Sandy Weill, the head of Citigroup, was nominated to serve as public
director of NYSE but withdrew after objection by Spitzer); Adrian Michaels & Joshua
Chaffin, SEC Looks to Impose Curbs on Watchdogs at State Level, FIN. TIMES (London),
April 14, 2003. The banking regulators were, however, resisting Spitzer's efforts to take
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still provide an extra policeman on the block-the SEC. At worst,
they promise protections that do not exist and restrict market
development, as well as impairing America's global
competitiveness in financial services, an area where we are fast
losing our comparative advantage.466  Not surprisingly, the
financial services industry has announced that 500,000 jobs will be
467
shifted offshore in future years.
Another regulatory model is needed. A simple one is
available. It is not a new one, but has been tested over time and
over the regulation of national banks. Greg Ip, Spitzer Tangles Again with Federal
Regulators, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2003, at A6. The state attorneys general are also vying
with the federal government for control over antitrust regulation. See, e.g., State of New
York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F.Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2002) (describing piggy backing by
state attorneys general in federal suits against Microsoft Corp. and demands for tougher
settlements than that sought by federal regulators). Christopher Bowe, Bristol-Myers
Settles Antitrust Suit for $670m, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 8, 2003, at 15 (settlement in
antitrust suit brought by state regulators in connection with generic drug competition);
Drug Firm to Pay $80 Million in Antitrust Suit, N.Y.U. L. J. Jan. 28, 2003, at 1 (Spitzer
settles antitrust claim against a pharmaceutical company on overpayments for drugs);
First USA Reaches Settlement Over Telemarketing Issues, N.Y.U. L. J., Jan. 2, 2003, at I
(settlement with New York and 27 other states over deceptive telemarketing to credit
card holders). The new SEC chairman announced at his confirmation hearings that he
intends to reign in Mr. Spitzer and his brethren. Solomon, supra note 114. The SEC has
long been in competition with state and local prosecutors. See MURPHY, supra note 108,
at 153 (competition between SEC and New York District Attorney Thomas E. Dewey
over prosecution of Richard Whitney, former NYSE head who stole large sums from a
NYSE trust fund for widows).
466 Strangely, as exemplified by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Congress seems to
have chosen more full disclosure regulations as the means to fix a system that has
already been proven to be a failure. Even more reactionary proposals are surfacing in the
form of short selling restrictions. John Labate, Short-Selling Faces Clampdown, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2003, at 1. Massachusetts had prohibited such sales in 1836 and
Pennsylvania in 1841, but such restrictions were found not to have worked. I
MARKHAM, supra note 5 1, at 161. Congress also investigated short selling after the stock
market crash of 1929. Congress Investigates Short Selling Practices, 11 CoNG. DIG.,
No. 12, at 289. Insider restrictions on short selling were imposed (15 U.S.C. § 78p) and
the SEC adopted a "tick test" (17 C.F.R. § 240.10Oa-1). See generally David C.
Worley, The Regulation of Short Sales: The Long and Short of It, 55 BROOK. L. REv.
1255 (1990) (short sale rule background and shortcomings). More extreme prohibitions
were rejected. Short selling restrictions were rejected altogether in the commodity
markets even though farmers were claiming that short sellers were driving prices down
below the cost of production. Commodity Short Selling, Hearing Before the House
Committee on Agriculture on H.R. 8829, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1932).
467 Michael Schroeder, More Financial Jobs Go Offshore, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2003,
at A2.
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has proved successful. Information should be treated for what is -
a commodity. As such, it has value and can be bought and sold
just as any other commodity. As is the case for other
commodities, the government should not require that this
commodity (information about securities) be given away for free
or that it be distributed in some particular manner, as is now
required by the federal securities laws.468
This principle of treating information as a mere commodity
was laid down by Chief Justice John Marshall at an early period in
our history. In Laidlaw v. Organ,469 the Supreme Court considered
the case of a purchase of tobacco by individuals who possessed
knowledge of the signing of the Treaty of Ghent and did not
disclose this knowledge to the seller. That news was obtained
from the British fleet by one of the purchasers and was valuable
information because it would result in a sharp rise in tobacco
prices (thirty to fifty percent).47 ° It was argued in that case that
"[s]uppression of material circumstances within the knowledge of
the vendee, and not accessible to the vendor, is equivalent to fraud,
and vitiates the contract., 471 In rejecting that claim, Justice
Marshall, for the Court, stated that:
The question in this case is, whether the intelligence of extrinsic
circumstances, which might influence the price of the
commodity, and which was exclusively within the knowledge of
the vendee, ought to have been communicated by him to the
vendor? The court is of opinion that he was not bound to
communicate it. It would be difficult to circumscribe the
contrary doctrine within proper limits, where the means of
intelligence are equally accessible to both parties. But at the
same time, each party must take care not to say or do any thing
468 Of course, those using that free information now will not want to pay for it.
469 15 U.S. 178 (1817).
470 As asserted by counsel:
This news was unexpected, even at Washington, much more at New Orleans,
the recent scene of the most sanguinary operations of the war. In answer to the
question, whether there was any news calculated to enhance the price of the
article, the vendee was silent. This reserve, when such a question was asked,
was equivalent to a false answer, and as much calculated to deceive as the
communication of the most fabulous intelligence.
Id. at 186-90.
471 Id. at 184-85.
[Vol. 28
RETHINKING FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
tending to impose upon the other. The court thinks that the
absolute instruction of the judge was erroneous, and that the
question, whether any imposition was practiced by the vendee
upon the vendor ought to have been submitted to the jury.472
This is a simple standard that has equal applicability to stocks.
If no required disclosures or equal information opportunity exist
for tobacco or other farming commodities, why is such a rule
needed for stocks? We often hear that there is something special
and overridingly important about the capital raising functions of
the stock market.473 That idea too does not withstand scrutiny.
Farming is the largest business enterprise in America.474 It is vital
to our economy and our very lives, but full disclosure is not
mandated for those persons buying and selling these commodities.
The second largest industry in the country is construction.475 It too
is vital to our daily lives and commerce. There is no SEC type
mandated disclosures for construction. Yet, nearly seventy
percent of families in America own their own homes, 47 6 and those
purchases were made without SEC style disclosures or accounting
opinions. Automobiles are other big-ticket items that do not
require SEC style disclosures.
Admittedly, this more pure market approach is clouded a bit
by labeling acts that require warnings or disclosures on consumer
goods such as tobacco and alcohol.477 Even so, those warnings are
472 Id. at 194.
473 The justification for the full disclosure model is said to be market efficiency
instead of fairness to customers. Steven L. Schwartz, Private Ordering, 97 Nw. U. L.
REv. 319, 346 (2002). This seems strange if one views information to be a commodity.
It will be for sale. The market will price it and make its distribution more efficient than a
government program that forces the commodity to be given away, using threats of jail as
the only incentive. Moreover, if free information makes a market more efficient, then
why not require the newspapers to make full disclosure and give their information away
without advertising or subscription charges?
474 David C. Beeder, Ag Groups Weigh in at Farm Bill Hearing, OMAHA WORLD
HERALD, June 16, 1995, at B20.
475 Lori Valigra, Building on the Web, BOSTON GLOBE, June 16, 1999, at D1.
476 III MARKHAM, supra note 132, at 314.
477 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, 15 U.S.C. § 1333
(2000); Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act, 27 U.S.C. § 217 (2000). Other federal
labeling acts include the: Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1461 (2000); Fur
Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 69g (2000); Wool Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 68e (2000); Federal Hazardous Substance Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (2000); the
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concise and are nowhere as detailed as the disclosures mandated
by the SEC, and no accountant's certification is required. Many
states also impose disclosure requirements 478 on items like real
estate. Many states now provide for forms disclosing known
defects in the sale of a residence. At least in North Carolina,
however, even those brief disclosures are voluntary.479
This labeling model is also used in the commodity markets
regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) under the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936.480 That
agency mandates a one-page risk disclosure statement that must be
given to customers trading commodity futures or option
contracts.4 8' These are generic risk disclosures that describe the
risks of trading in general terms. 482 They do not purport to provide
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125 & 1304 (2000); and Textile Fiber Products Labeling
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 70e (2000).
478 State labeling statutes may be preempted by federal requirements. See, e.g.,
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (federal warning preempted state
warning requirements but did not preempt state fraud laws and warranties); Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (considering preemption of California laws by federal
Fair Packing and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1461).
479 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47E-1 et. seq. (2002). Of course, anyone attending a house
closing has been appalled and overwhelmed by the disclosure documents required for the
mortgage, termites, and other things. Still, we have no SEC mandated accounting
statements or a requirement of "full disclosure."
480 7 U.S.C. § I et seq (2000).
481 See e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (disclosure form for futures traders).
482 The risk disclosure form for futures trading (17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (2003)) states that:
The risk of loss in trading commodity futures contracts can be substantial. You
should, therefore, carefully consider whether such trading is suitable for you in
light of your circumstances and financial resources. You should be aware of the
following points:
(1) You may sustain a total loss of the funds that you deposit with your broker
to establish or maintain a position in the commodity futures market, and you
may incur losses beyond these amounts. If the market moves against your
position, you may be called upon by your broker to deposit a substantial amount
of additional margin funds, on short notice, in order to maintain your position. If
you do not provide the required funds within the time required by your broker,
your position may be liquidated at a loss, and you will be liable for any resulting
deficit in your account.
(2) Under certain market conditions, you may find it difficult or impossible to
liquidate a position. This can occur, for example, when the market reaches a
daily price fluctuation limit ("limit move").
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a certified accounting statement on pork bellies or the S&P 500
Index that also trades in these markets. Of course, government
being what it is, the disclosure form can easily become so
complicated and convoluted that customer protection is lost.
48 3
(3) Placing contingent orders, such as "stop-loss" or "stop-limit" orders, will not
necessarily limit your losses to the intended amounts, since market conditions
on the exchange where the order is placed may make it impossible to execute
such orders.
(4) All futures positions involve risk, and a "spread" position may not be less
risky than an outright "long" or "short" position.
(5) The high degree of leverage (gearing) that is often obtainable in futures
trading because of the small margin requirements can work against you as well
as for you. Leverage (gearing) can lead to large losses as well as gains.
(6) You should consult your broker concerning the nature of the protections
available to safeguard funds or property deposited for your account. All of the
points noted above apply to all futures trading whether foreign or domestic. In
addition, if you are contemplating trading foreign futures or options contracts,
you should be aware of the following additional risks:
(7) Foreign futures transactions involve executing and clearing trades on a
foreign exchange. This is the case even if the foreign exchange is formally
"linked" to a domestic exchange, whereby a trade executed on one exchange
liquidates or establishes a position on the other exchange. No domestic
organization regulates the activities of a foreign exchange, including the
execution, delivery, and clearing of transactions on such an exchange, and no
domestic regulator has the power to compel enforcement of the rules of the
foreign exchange or the laws of the foreign country. Moreover, such laws or
regulations will vary depending on the foreign country in which the transaction
occurs. For these reasons, customers who trade on foreign exchanges may not
be afforded certain of the protections which apply to domestic transactions,
including the right to use domestic alternative dispute resolution procedures. In
particular, funds received from customers to margin foreign futures transactions
may not be provided the same protections as funds received to margin futures
transactions on domestic exchanges. Before you trade, you should familiarize
yourself with the foreign rules which will apply to your particular transaction.
(8) Finally, you should be aware that the price of any foreign futures or option
contract and, therefore, the potential profit and loss resulting therefrom, may be
affected by any fluctuation in the foreign exchange rate between the time the
order is placed and the foreign futures contract is liquidated or the foreign
option contract is liquidated or exercised.
This Brief Statement Cannot, of Course, Disclose all the Risks and Other
Aspects of the Commodity Markets.
I hereby acknowledge that I have received and understood this risk disclosure
statement.
483 Although many consumers, including this author, are still unclear what "APR"
really means under the Truth-In-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (2002), it does at least
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What should an SEC mandated disclosure contain? Certainly,
investors should be warned that certification of a corporation's
financial statements by a CPA does not assure their accuracy. The
fact that few people can outperform the market through individual
stock picking should be included, as well as the dangers of
analysts' conflicts." 4
A commodity-based model, if applied to the regulation of
securities, should prohibit fraud as seen in the Laidlaw case. This
requirement is essential to any commodity transaction. Stock and
tobacco are no different in that regard. Insider trading poses a
more difficult issue. In the commodity model, such a concept in
reality does not exist. If one has information unavailable to others,
one may generally trade on that information. Indeed, such trading
is thought to be desirable because it better prices goods and makes
markets more efficient, and no one begrudges a reward to those
bringing this information to market. For example, if one discovers
a wheat rust in a field that will damage the entire region's crop
badly when it spreads, one is perfectly entitled to trade on that
information. The result will be to increase prices and signal to the
market that there will be a shortage of wheat. Alternate supplies
can then be arranged or other adjustments made. 5
In a commodity model system, companies could use their
advertising to sell their stocks to the public. Like all advertising,
puffery will be used and consumers will have to deal with that
problem, as they do with other advertising."6 Where there is fraud
and deceit, then remedies and government prosecution should be
available. Some companies may choose not to disclose their
provide a concise basis for comparison of interest rates.
484 This is not to say that out performing the market cannot happen. Bill Miller,
manager of the Legg Mason Value Trust did it for twelve straight years but was still
losing money in 2002. Legg Mason Value Trust Fund Outpaced the S&P 500, 57
KIPLINGER'S PERS. FN., Feb., 2003, at 37; Mark Hulbert, Strategies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
2003, § 3, at 6.
485 The agricultural model is still an imperfect one. Subsidization continues for
some commodities despite the Freedom to Farm Act of 1992. Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110
Stat. 888. See generally Michael R. Taylor, The Emerging Merger of Agricultural and
Environmental Policy: Building a New Vision for the Future ofAmerican Agriculture, 20
VA. ENVTL. L. J. 169 (2001) (describing agricultural subsidies).
486 The author, for example, has long ago concluded that the advertised remedies for
baldness fall short of their claims. He has also had similar experiences with claims for
kitchen knives.
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finances. Investors must then decide whether to invest without that
information. Many investors will elect not to do so. Others may
value the company as a random event, investing only if there is a
high risk-reward ratio. This is the method by which lotteries and
other gambling enterprises operate.
Insider trading, of course, has become a moral issue that the
SEC has used since the 1960s to defend the full disclosure
concept.487 That banner too is frayed but could be adapted to a
commodity model for its adherents.488 The CFTC conducted a
study early in its history to determine whether SEC inside trader
prohibitions should be applied to commodity trading. It
determined that it should not adopt such a prohibition because it
would impair the efficiency of the markets.489 For those
demanding protection against inside trading by corporate officers,
however, the misappropriation theory adopted by the Supreme
Court will fit a commodity based regulatory model.49° Otherwise,
487 An effort had been made to cut the aggressive SEC enforcement program during
the Reagan administration. The head of that program, Stanley Sporkin, was eased out to
become general counsel at the CIA. This action aroused much criticism by his
congressional supporters, and they began an investigation of the personal finances of the
SEC chairman. In order to divert their attention, the new enforcement head embarked on
an aggressive insider trading program that looked like a safe way to satisfy critics on
both sides of the issue. The doctrine of unexpected consequences intervened, however,
when this effort unexpectedly turned up the Boesky and related insider trading scandals
and culminated in the prosecution of Michael Milken. The enforcement director was not
given any reward for this effort. Instead, he was driven from office by claims that he
was beating his wife. This interesting scenario is how SEC full disclosure policy was
made in Washington, D.C. Jerry W. Markham, The Lawyer's Bookshelf, Eagle on the
Street, N.Y.U. L. J., Dec. 9, 1991.
488 As one critic of full disclosure has noted:
Insider-trading regulation has its primordial introduction in the muck of New
Deal securities regulation, which was itself justified on the trumped-up theory
that full disclosure was the best way to deal with corporate fraud and deception.
Over the years, the benign-sounding idea of passive regulation in the form of
full disclosure has morphed into a morass of active regulation. Full disclosure
now wraps around -and regulates - corporate governance, accounting,
takeovers, investment banking, financial analysts, corporate counsel, and, not
least, insider trading.
Henry G. Manne, The Case for Insider Trading, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2003, at A 14.
489 COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, A STUDY OF THE NATURE, EXTENT
AND EFFECTS OF FUTURES TRADING BY PERSONS POSSESSING MATERIAL NONPUBLIC
INFORMATION (1986).
490 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
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market information available to anyone, even if accessible by a
few, could be freely used to trade,49 but theft of the information
would be prohibited. After all, commodity theft (e.g., cattle
rustling) is prohibited, and that prohibition is everywhere
applauded. Indeed, the CFTC used the misappropriation theory to
attack futures trading by two individuals based on information
they purloined from their employer. 9 2
In all events, the concept of full disclosure under the securities
laws needs to be revisited. This statute holds out a promise it
cannot deliver. Investors are told that this legislation assures full
disclosure.493 It does not. The SEC does not have the resources to
examine these disclosures in any depth. It has tried to shift that
burden to the accountants, but as shown, the accountant is in no
position to assure accuracy. Even where compliance is faithfully
made, the act sets the stage for litigation after any dip in the
stock's price, providing a bonanza to the class action bar. 94 Full
disclosure requirements also assure that investors will be receiving
"junk stock" that poses a speculative risk well beyond the much
ostracized junk bonds made popular by Michael Milken. 495 An
initial public offering is almost inevitably a speculative venture
491 As the Supreme Court has noted, even under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), no duty to disclose arises because of the
"mere possession of nonpublic market information." Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
492 CFTC v. Kelly, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 27,465 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); see also United
States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1985) (wire and mail fraud prosecution for front
running customer orders).
493 This almost religious belief in full disclosure is exemplified by statements of an
SEC chairman, Arthur Levitt: "When the public loses confidence in our markets, or
when the reliability of the numbers is diminished, the whole system is jeopardized...
The sanctity of the numbers and of their reliability must be there." McNamee, et al.,
supra note 325, at 156. The problem is that their sanctity is not there and cannot be
assured. So why suggest otherwise to investors?
494 Class action lawsuits were claimed to have "contributed to" the loss of $1.9
trillion in market value in public companies in 2002. D&O insurance costs at General
Electric increased to $22.1 million up from $5.8 million. Vincent Boland, Class-Action
Lawsuits Add to Market Loss, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2003, at 19.
495 Of course, as the late Arthur Liman pointed out in his defense of Milken, junk
bond holders must be paid off in full in the event of a corporation's failure before the
common stockholders receive anything. Yet, no one refers to stock as "junk stock."
ARTHUR LIMAN, LAWYER, A LIFE OF COUNSEL AND CONTROVERSY 268 (1998).
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with high risks. IPO allocations ("spinning")496 assure that the
rewards of a hot issue will be gained by the favored and the losses
will be experienced by those in the secondary market. Few of the
investors in these ventures will have read the long and convoluted
prospectus and financial statements required by the Securities Act
of 1933. Conflicts of interest and now Regulation FD assure that
no independent and informed review will be made of those
documents and disclosures.
Exemptions to the Securities Act of 1933 further assure that
customers receive junk stock. Institutions provide loans and
capital to corporations through offerings that are exempted from
the federal securities laws. Only when that source of capital is
exhausted, do issuers seek to tap the public market. Private
placements are made in advance of a public offering on favorable
terms that allow those qualifying to reap the rewards of an
ascending investment. Private creditors can also assure their
positions through secured financing and other protective measures.
As a result, the federal securities laws have created a trickle down
effect, which leaves retail investors with the leftover offerings of
"junk" stock.497
Of course, a departure from the SEC mandated full disclosure
regime will require great faith in market discipline.498 There seems
to be a general consensus that market discipline will work, but that
the process is slow and needs to be augmented by government
496 See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
497 Institutions provide loans and capital to corporations through offerings that are
exempted from the federal securities laws. Only when that source of capital is exhausted
do issuers seek to tap the public market. Even where institutional investors purchase
publicly traded securities, they will be more astute than retail investors in their
investment strategy. For example, where there is a sharp market decline many small
investors will sell their securities, only to see the market recover shortly afterwards.
498 One suggestion has been that dividends should be used to value the business, i.e.,
the amount and regular payment of dividends would evidence the worth of a company.
Jeremy Siegel, The Dividend Deficit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2002, at A20. This idea
would be made easier by the elimination of the double tax on dividends. See generally
Jane Fuller, Global Investors, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2003, at 24 (describing proposal by
President George W. Bush to eliminate personal taxes on corporate dividends).
Dividend signaling might be useful but will also give rise to abuses in the form of Ponzi
schemes and the robbing of future growth to maintain dividend strength. At the end of
the day, it will fall on management to devise the means to gain market confidence.
Those that fail will be punished by the market. Those that resort to fraud will also be
punished by the SEC and other regulators.
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action. The market, however, has shown a far superior ability to
discipline itself than all of the state and federal securities
regulators combined. 99 As of this writing, not a single wrongdoer
in the Enron or other debacles has gone to jail. Yet, the market put
Enron out of business some eighteen months ago. °° WorldCom
and others soon followed. Those results would seem to undercut
claims that government regulation is more efficient.
This is not to suggest that there is not an important role for the
SEC to play. The agency should be redirected to pursuing fraud
and dropping its command and control efforts to guide the market.
There seems to be more than enough fraud to attack, and by
having the SEC concentrate on such conduct, perhaps, state laws
could be preempted in order to take financial institutions out from
the cross fire of the headline seeking state regulators. The
adoption of a commodity-based information model also does not
mean that accounting statements will no longer have any value.
They will be worth exactly what they provide: a statement by
management of the company's financial position with some
minimal verification by a third party auditor paid for by the
persons being audited. If that information is not satisfactory, then
an investor may insist on a new auditor before risking its own
money or engage its own auditor and demand access to the books
and records of the company, presumably under a confidentiality
agreement. Other factors must be used to value the company as
well. Analysts could play that role but are so conflicted that they
add little value. Analysts' compensation should, therefore, be low
499 This is not to say that market solutions will be perfect. They will not be, but
they will be better than the false hopes raised by the SEC full disclosure regime.
500 The Enron bankruptcy was, at the end of the day, a business failure. As one
author notes:
Like GE under Jack Welch, Enron under Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling pursued
maximum shareholder value. Like GE's managers, Enron's pursued a plausible
and innovative business plan. The firm collapsed for the most mundane of
reasons-its managers suffered the behavioral biases of successful
entrepreneurs. They overemphasized the upside and lacked patience. They
pursued heroic short-term growth numbers that their business plan could not
deliver. That pursuit of immediate shareholder value caused them to become
risk-prone, engaging in levered speculation, earnings manipulation, and
concealment of critical information.
William Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1275,
1283 (2002).
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in a commodity-based model until their services provide value.
Ratings agencies also provide an information service. They are
selling a commodity, i.e., their view on the creditworthiness of the
customer. It is only worth whatever value is added by that service.
Conclusion
The SEC did nothing to aid recovery during the depression. It
was removed from any significant role during World War II. The
agency flailed helplessly against the underworld of characters
looting public companies during the 1950s and failed in
preventing penny stock frauds in Canadian and other mining
properties. The SEC lurched from crisis to crisis after it launched
itself on an activist course in the 1960s. This could all be forgiven
as a natural process. After all, fraud will occur with or without the
SEC. What cannot be forgiven is that the SEC had over fifty years
to prepare for and prevent the bubble of the 1990s and all the
resulting excesses. That was its mission. That was its stress test.
It failed. Ancient truth was revealed. Markets go up and they go
down. That is what a market does, and it is a necessary part of our
economy. Despite the thicket of the incredibly complex
regulations it adopted and its aggressive expansion of the full
disclosure concept, the SEC could not change that immutable rule.
Government efforts to command and control the market process
does not make the market more efficient. It only results in more
folly. There is nothing radical in that notion. It is has been proven
time and again from the extremes in the Soviet Union to lesser
efforts in Japan and elsewhere.
Full disclosure certainly seemed like an empty promise after
the bubble burst in 2000. The demands of full disclosure had
forced managers into the role of managing numbers, rather than
long-term business goals, or building businesses or the other
occupations that management might be expected to manage. If the
product was lagging, buy another company to improve the
numbers. If debt was too high, move if off the balance sheet in
order to improve the numbers. Keep no reserves for hard times
because full disclosure did not allow for such reserves, secret or
otherwise. If revenue was lagging, fake it. The demands of full
disclosure were all consuming and completely geared to short term
profits. What a way to run a business!
In all events, full disclosure proved to be a myth for American
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investors. It did not stop the market bubble. It did not stop fraud.
Investors were not protected by the registration and periodic
disclosure requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.01
The SEC could assure the accuracy of those statements, and the
accountant's certification of SEC Form 10K 5°2 did not provide
such an assurance. Investors were misled by the SEC into
believing that such requirements do provide protection. Full
disclosure as investor protection was a fallacy well proved in the
last market meltdown. Neither the SEC nor the accounting
profession can truly certify the accuracy of accounting -statements.
Auditors are a useful tool in the process, but have their limitations.
The auditor is simply selling information. That information will
be as valuable as the audit is thorough and independent.
In order to make full disclosure work, seemingly every public
company must be sued periodically by the SEC and their
executives must all be indicted. Everyone connected with the
securities must be turned into "gatekeepers", read informers. We
are being told by scores of academicians and government
prosecutors that there is something fundamentally wrong with the
corporate governance system that has produced wealth
unparalleled in the history of man." 3 They advocate their
replacement by "outside" directors who know little of the business
and cannot take hands-on control, lest they too become insiders.
That course is folly. The responsibility for disclosure falls to
management, and that should be a market issue. Information is a
commodity for management to manage and or to bargain away
where appropriate. If management misappropriates that
commodity, it may be properly punished. If fraud is at issue,
government sanctions can be added to that market discipline. If
management fails and mismanages the use of that commodity, the
market will respond accordingly, as it did with Enron.
501 15 U.S.C. §§ 781 & 78m (2000).
502 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2003).
503 As one newspaper editorial comment notes with respect to the corporation:
"[T]he company's gainsayers... are wrong; the company has been an institution that has
changed the world enormously for the better. Indeed, it has been the secret of the west's
success." Micklethwait & Wooldridge, supra note 463, at 1.
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